Section 5: Business and Commerce by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1995
Section 5: Business and Commerce
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law, "Section 5: Business and Commerce" (1995). Supreme
Court Preview. Paper 31.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/31
IT'S NOT ABOUT GUNS
The Court's Lopez Decision Is Really About Limits on Government
The Washington Post, Sunday, May 21, 1995
reproduced with the consent of the author
Roger Pilon
Last November, on the day that voters were
electing the most anti-Washington Congress since
before the New Deal, the Supreme Court was hearing
oral argument in United States v. Lopez, a case that
questioned the very foundations of the post-New Deal
world. Conventional wisdom was stunned by the
results of the November election. It was shocked again
late last month when the court handed down its
decision in Lopez.
Could the New Deal be on the ropes not only in
the political but in the legal arena as well? Not yet,
but the potential is there.
In 1992, Alfonso Lopez, a 12th-grade student
living in San Antonio, Tex., brought a handgun to
school in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act
Congress had passed in 1990. Although Texas law
already banned having a gun at school, Lopez was
charged under the federal statute. Rather than treat this
as a gun-control case, however, Lopez's public
defender asked a simple question: Where did
Congress find its authority to enact the statute?
A question of that kind is so rare today as to be
all but impertinent. Yet there it was. After the Court
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit found for Lopez --
Judge William L. Garwood reminding federal
attomeys that the Constitution "establishes a national
government of limited and enumerated powers" - the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. When all the
dust had settled, the high court too agreed with Lopez:
Congress in fact did not have authority to pass the
statute.
Notwithstanding comments from the losing side,
from PresidntL Clton on doAn, TLpe is thus nt
about guns or school safety or even states rights. It is
about authority. And that, precisely, is what has jarred
official Washington. Indeed, the case raises the most
basic questions in politics: Where does government
get its authority, and what is the scope of that
authority? Those questions have hardly been asked
since the New Deal.
In fact, when it enacted the statute, Congress
never even bothered to cite the source of its authority.
Much later, after the government lost in the 5th
Circuit, Congress patched together a quick,
retrospective rationale, invoking the Constitution's
tried-and-true commerce clause -- the power of
Congress "to regulate commerce among the several
states." Through that single power, Congress has
brought about the vast regulatory state we know
today, mostly since the New Deal.
Thus, if the commerce power is less robust than
we thought - which is what the court said for the first
time in nearly 60 years -- the constitutional
foundations of the modem regulatory state are in
jeopardy. For a nation that prides itself on
constitutional government, that is no small matter.
Just to be clear, the court stopped well short of
declaring modem commerce-clause regulation
unconstitutional. In fact, as Justice Clarence Thomas
made clear plain in his trenchant concurrence, the
court still has a very ample view of the commerce
clause - a view utterly at odds with the court's
limited-government premise. Sooner or later,
therefore, the court is going to have to come to grips
with that inconsistency.
The nub of the matter is found in the court's
premise, which is nothing less than the Constitution's
premise. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for
the majority in Lopez, put it simply: "We start with
first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers."
In America, legal power arises from the people.
More precisely, the Constitution establishes a
government of delegated, enumerated and thus limited
powers. Power is delegated by the founding generation
(that makes it legitimate); enumerated in the
Constitution (that makes it legal); and limited by
virtue of that delegation and enumeration.
Students of the Constitution -- and of "The
Federalist Papers" in particular - know full well that
without that foundation our system is shorn of any
pretense of legitimacy. To be sure, succeeding
generations can amend the Constitution, adding or
subtracting powers. But to be legitimate, power must
first be authorized. Otherwise it is illegal.
The problem of illegitimacy arose in spades
during the New Deal, of course, when Congress and
the executive undertook programs that were in no way
authorized by the Constitution as it had been
interpreted for the previous 150 years. President
Roosevelt acknowledged as much in 1935 in a letter
to the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee: "I hope your committee will not permit
doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to
block the suggested legislation."
When the court found that the New Deal
Congress had indeed gone beyond its authority, rather
than try to expand that authority through constitutional
amendment, Roosevelt threatened to pack the court
with six addition members. There followed the famous
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"switch in time that saved nine:" the court
reinterpreted the commerce clause in the 1937 Jones
& Laughlin case and the modem regulatory state
poured through the opening, all without benefit of
constitutional amendment.
Although many historians have pointed to a
recalcitrant, reactionary court as the source of the
problem, that view today is increasingly challenged.
Indeed, it was undercut in 1968 by no less than
Rexford Tugwell, one of the New Deal's principal
architects: "To the extent that [our policies]
developed, they were tortured interpretations of a
document intended to prevent them."
Yet in the three dissents in Lopez, we find just
such "tortured interpretations," with Justice David
Souter going so far as to speak of "the untenable
jurisprudence from which the court extracted itself
almost 60 years ago." One imagines our first 150
years to have been one grand jurisprudential mistake.
Indeed, in not one of the dissents -- nor even in
the concurrence by Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor - do we find even a
mention of enumerated powers. It is as if the
Constitution arose, Phoenix-like, in 1937, with the
court thereafter playing interpretive handmaiden to the
political branches, finding powers that are nowhere
enumerated in the document.
But the majority itself is not immune from the
charge of "activism" in finding powers nowhere
granted, as Thomas alone plainly sees. For the
post-New Deal rule it leaves in place - whereby
Congress has power to regulate anything that
"substantially affects" interstate commerce - is not
only inconsistent with the terms and purpose of the
commerce clause but effectively guts the doctrine of
enumerated powers, the very premise of the
Constitution.
As Thomas notes, if this single power of
Congress were so vast, what was the point of having
enumerated Congress's other powers? The dissent's
reading of ue commerc clause u bounudles, Lie
concludes, but the majority's reading is little better.
Where does this leave us constitutionally? In
declaring that Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce is not a power to regulate everything, the
court took the occasion to reassert our founding
principle of limited government. This far down the
regulatory road that is no small matter. At the least, it
is a benchmark to which Congress itself can repair,
following November's election, as it tries to re-limit
government politically. But unless the court is more
prepared than it appears to be in Lopez to develop a
principled theory of the commerce power, it may be
some time before our government is again limited
constitutionally.
Thus, one reading of Lopez is this: We, the court,
cannot do it alone. The political branches, through the
extra-constitutional court-packing threat of 1937,
pressured us into this untenable jurisprudence. Now
let them bail us out by re-limiting their own power,
thus giving us a green light to reassert candidly the
full reach of the constitutional principles of limited
government. If the election of last November was a
true reflection of the wish of the American people to
relimit their government, it may turn out to have had
not only political but constitutional implications as
well.
Roger Pilon directs the Center for
Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.
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EXCERPTS OF OPINIONS ON GUN BAN NEAR SCHOOLS
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
Thursday, April 27, 1995
Following are excerpts from the Supreme
Court's decision today in United States v. Lopez,
declaring unconstitutional a Federal law banning the
possession of guns near schools. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
and was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. Dissenting were John Paul Stevens, David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer.
FROM THE DECISION By Chief Justice
Rehnquist
In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
Congress made it a Federal offense "for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A).
The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce. We
hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress
"(t)o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States. . . ." U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3....
We start with first principles. The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers.. .. The Constitution delegates to Congress
the power "(t)o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3....
We have identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instirunentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress's commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce and those
activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
We now turn to consider the power of Congress,
in the light of this framework, to enact §922(q). The
first two categories of authority may be quickly
disposed of: §922(q) is not a regulation of the use of
the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an
attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a
commodity through the channels of commerce; nor
can §922(q) be justified as a regulation by which
Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a thing in interstate
commerce. Thus, if §922(q) is to be sustained, it
must be under the third category as a regulation of
an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce....
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce....
The Government's essential contention, in fine,
is that we may determine here that §922(q) is valid
because possession of a firearm in a local school
zone does indeed substantially affect interstate
commerce. The Government argues that possession
of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent
crime and that violent crime can be expected to
affect the functioning of the national economy in two
ways. First, the costs of violent crime are
substantial, and, through the mechanism of
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the
population. Second, violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within
the country that are perceived to be unsafe. The
Government also argues that the presence of guns in
schools poses a substantial threat to the educational
process by threatening the learning environment. A
handicapped educational process, in turn, will result
in a less productive citizenry. That, in turn, would
have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic
well-being. As a result, the Government argues that
Congress could rationally have concluded that
§922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.
We pause to consider the implications. . . The
Government admits, under its "costs of crime"
reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce. Similarly, under the
Government's "national productivity" reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found
was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
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divorce, and child custody), for example. Under the
theories that the Government presents in support of
§922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
Federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate.
For instance, if Congress can, pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that
adversely affect the learning environment, then, a
fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process
directly. Congress could determine that a school's
curriculum has a "significant" effect on the extent of
classroom learning. As a result, Congress could
mandate a Federal curriculum for local elementary
and secondary schools because what is taught in
local schools has a significant "effect on classroom
learning," cf. post, at 9, and that, in turn, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce....
We do not doubt that Congress has authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous
commercial activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce and also affect the educational
process. That authority, though broad, does not
include the authority to regulate each and every
aspect of local schools....
BY JUSTICE THOMAS, Concurring
The Court today properly concludes that the
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the
authority to prohibit gun possession within 1,000
feet of a school, as it attempted to do in the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4844. Although I join the
majority, I write separately to observe that our case
law has drifted far from the original understanding
of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we ought
to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a
manner that both makes sense of our more recent
case law and is more faithful to the original
understanding of that Clause.
FROM THE DISSENT By Justice Breyer
The issue in this case is whether the Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to enact a statute that
makes it a crime to possess a gun in, or near, a
school. In my view, the statute falls well within the
scope of the commerce power as this Court has
understood that power over the last half-century...
The Constitution requires us to judge the
connection between a regulated activity and
interstate commerce, not directly, but at one remove.
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in
determining the existence of a significant factual
connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce both because the Constitution
delegates the commerce power directly to Congress
and because the determination requires an empirical
judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely
than a court to make with accuracy. The traditional
words "rational basis" capture this leeway. Thus, the
specific question before us, as the Court recognizes,
is not whether the "regulated activity sufficiently
affected interstate commerce," but, rather, whether
Congress could have had "a rational basis" for so
concluding. . .
Applying these principles to the case at hand,
we must ask whether Congress could have had a
rational basis for finding a significant (or
substantial) connection between gun-related school
violence and interstate commerce. Or, to put the
question in the language of the explicit finding that
Congress made when it amended this law in 1994:
Could Congress rationally have found that "violent
crime in school zones," through its effect on the
"quality of education," significantly (or
substantially) affects "interstate" or "foreign
commerce"? As long as one views the commerce
connection not as a "technical legal conception" but
as "a practical one," Swift & Co. v. United States,
the answer to this question must be yes. Numerous
reports and studies generated both inside and outside
government make clear that Congress could
reasonably have found the empirical connection that
its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts.
Having found that guns in schools significantly
undermine the quality of education in our Nation's
classrooms, Congress could also have found, given
the effect of education upon interstate and foreign
commerce, that gun-related violence in and around
schools is a commercial, as well as a human,
problem. Education, although far more than a matter
of economics, has long been inextricably intertwined
with the Nation's economy. . . .
Specifically, Congress could have found that
gun-related violence near the classroom poses a
serious economic threat (1) to consequently
inadequately educated workers who must endure low
paying jobs, see, and (2) to communities and
businesses that might (in today's "information
society") otherwise gain, from a well-educated work
force, an important commercial advantage, of a kind
that location near a railhead or harbor provided in
the past. Congress might also have found these
threats to be no different in kind from other threats
that this Court has found within the commerce
power, such as the threat that loan sharking poses to
the "fuinds" of "numerous localities," Perez v. United
States, and that unfair labor practices pose to
instrumentalities of commerce, see Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB.
To hold this statute constitutional is not to
"obliterate" the "distinction of what is national and
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what is local," ante; nor is it to hold that the but I would raise a caveat. Not every epochal case
Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government has come in epochal trappings.
to "regulate any activity that it found was related to
the economic productivity of individual citizens," to
regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody," or to
regulate any and all aspects of education. Ante.
In sum, a holding that the particular statute
before us falls within the commerce power would
not expand the scope of that Clause. Rather, it
simply would apply pre-existing law to changing
economic circumstances.
BY JUSTICE SOUTER, Dissenting
The practice of deferring to rationally based
legislative judgments "is a paradigm of judicial
restraint." In judicial review under the Commerce
Clause, it reflects our respect for the institutional
competence of the Congress on a subject expressly
assigned to it by the Constitution and our
appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from
Congress's political accountability in dealing with
matters open to a wide range of possible choices. .
The modem respect for the competence and
primacy of Congress in matters affecting commerce
developed only after one of this Court's most
chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated
an earlier and untenably expansive conception of
judicial review in derogation of Congressional
commerce power. A look at history's sequence will
serve to show how today's decision tugs the Court
off course, leading it to suggest opportunities for
further developments that would be at odds with the
rule of restraint to which the Court still wisely states
adherence...
Thus, it seems fair to ask whether the step taken
by the Court today does anything but portend a
return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the
Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago. The
answer is not reassur.g....
The question for the courts, as all agree, is not
whether as a predicate to legislation Congress in fact
found that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce. The legislation implies such a
finding, and there is no reason to entertain claims
that Congress acted ultra vires intentionally. Nor is
the question whether Congress was correct in so
finding. The only question is whether the legislative
judgment is within the realm of reason. .
Because JUSTICE BREYER'S opinion
demonstrates beyond any doubt that the Act in
question passes the rationality review that the Court
continues to espouse, today's decision may be seen
as only a misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions
not quite in gear with the prevailing standard, but
hardly an epochal case. I would not argue otherwise,
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UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDS COURT RULING ON COMMERCE
But Experts Agree Ruling Limits Congress, May Jeopardize Laws
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Copyright 1995
Tuesday, May 2, 1995
William H. Freivogel
One law professor calls it the biggest decision
in half a century. Another calls it a blip on the
constitutional landscape.
The simple truth is that not even the experts
know the long-range importance of last week's
decision in U.S. vs. Lopez, in which the court took
some of the wallop out of Congress' strong right fist
- its power to regulate most anything it pleases
under its authority to regulate interstate commerce.
For the first time since 1936, the court limited
Congress' power to use the commerce clause to
criminalize and regulate activities that once were the
province of the states. Voting 5-4, the court
overturned the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which made it illegal to have a gun within 1,000 feet
of a school.
Despite uncertainties about the decision,
lawyers agree that it:
Reacts to the break-neck speed with which
Congress has been federalizing criminal law.
Federal laws on carjackings, arson, money
laundering, extortion, streets gangs, drug-free
schools and rape may now be in question.
Threatens environmental laws because Congress
often didn't explain the connection between those
laws and interstate commerce.
Puts the court in sync with Congress' emphasis
on restoring federalism by returning power to the
states.
"It's almost as if they signed on to the Contract
with America," says Alan J. Howard of St. Louis
University Law School.
That's part of the problem, says Bruce La
Pierre, a Washington University law professor. An
avowedly conservative court should let Congress
make political decisions, he says.
"Why is it that a conservative court feels
compelled to intervene when the proposals to
expand state power are being made in Congress?" he
asked. "There is a measure of hypocrisy to be so
interested in judicial activism."
Kathleen F. Brickey, another law professor at
Washington University, believes Lopez is partly a
reaction to Congress' fondness for federal crimes.
There are now more than 3,000 federal crimes, many
based on the commerce clause. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, who wrote Lopez, has
frequently cautioned Congress against the trend.
But Brickey doesn't believe that the decision
will do much to slow down the trend. "Doing
something as popular as being tough on crime is
politically irresistible," she says.
A HISTORY LESSON
Every school-age child in America has a history
lesson on the great U.S. Supreme Court decisions of
Chief Justice John Marshall. The 1824 Gibbons vs.
Ogden opinion is one.
Aaron Ogden, a former New Jersey governor,
operated a ferry between Elizabethtown, N.J., and
New York City under a monopoly granted by New
York. Thomas Gibbons, his former partner, ran a
rival boat licensed by the federal government.
A New York court ordered Gibbons to stop his
ferry. In overturning that ruling, Marshall laid the
cornerstone of broad congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce. He wrote:
The commerce power "is the power to
regulate. . . . This power, like all others vested
in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than (those
that) are prescribed in the Constitution."
During the first third of this century, the
Supreme Court took a much narrower view than
Marshall. For example, it said the commerce clause
wasn't broad enough to permit Congress to pass a
law discouraging child labor.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing
plan forced a shift on the court and over the past
half-century, the 16-word commerce clause has been
used to uphold civil rights, protect the environment,
improve working conditions and fight crime.
The court upheld Congress' actions even when
there was a tenuous connection to interstate
commerce:
It upheld Congress' power to force Roscoe
Filburn to comply with federal farm laws even
though he was growing wheat for his own use on his
Ohio farm.
It upheld the 1964 Civil Rights Act even though
Ollie McClung's segregated ribs joint in
Birmingham, Ala., only served people from the
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state. It was enough that some food came from out
of state.
It said Congress could prosecute a "loan shark"
for extortionate lending even though the money
never went out of state. Loan sharks were involved
in organized crime, which was interstate enough.
But in the Lopez decision, Rehnquist said there
had to be a limit.
One safeguard in the Constitution was its
limited delegation of powers to the federal
government. For the court to uphold the 1990 gun
law, it would have to conclude that the
"Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated ... and that
there never will be a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local."
HOW BROAD?
At its narrowest, Lopez might not even wipe out
the gun-free schools law, says Howard of St. Louis
University. One reason the court overturned the
1990 gun law was that Congress didn't include
findings on what guns in schools had to do with
interstate commerce. Last year, Congress re-enacted
the law and included findings that violent crime in
schools had caused a decline in the quality of
education, which hurt the United States in interstate
and foreign commerce.
Most likely, however, this finding won't be
enough to support the law. Without addressing it
directly, Rehnquist seemed to reject the reasoning.
To say that guns in schools affected commerce was
a limitless argument that would open up the
educational arena to federal regulation, even
allowing the government to impose a national
curriculum, he wrote.
Most legal experts now expect a series of legal
challenges to the federal laws with the most tenuous
connections to interstate commerce. Some criminal
laws that duplicate local laws could be ripe for
challenge, says Brickey of Washington University.
For example, last year's crime bill included violence
against women provisions. But rape traditionally has
been prosecuted by the states.
Justice David H. Souter, one of the dissenters,
suggested that the court might be returning to the
"discredited" era when it struck down child-labor
laws.
But most law professors don't expect that.
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor, both in the majority, stressed that they
would not reconsider the commerce clause's
application to the Civil Rights Act or to situations
like the loan shark case.
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CLINTON SAYS GUN RULING IS A THREAT
President Will Seek To Renew Ban on Schoolyard Firearms
The Washington Post, Copyright 1995
Sunday, April 30, 1995
Ann Devroy; Al Kamen
Washington Post Staff Writers
President Clinton yesterday called the Supreme
Court decision striking down a schoolyard firearms
ban a threat to children and ordered the Justice
Department to produce within a week legislation
that could circumvent the ruling.
Clinton, in his weekly radio address, said
Wednesday's ruling "could condemn more of our
children to going to schools where there are guns"
and said he was "terribly disappointed" in the
decision. He said one way to "reverse the practical
impact" of the ruling might be to require
communities receiving federal school aid to ban
firearms within a certain proximity to schools.
The Supreme Court, in striking down the 1990
law banning guns within 1,000 feet of a school, said
congressional power to regulate interstate economic
activity did not extend to such a gun ban. The
government had cited the Constitution's interstate
commerce clause in arguing that gun possession
leads to violence and violence has an adverse effect
on national economic activity.
Clinton said the law was "a bipartisan approach
to school safety based on common sense." The
legislation was supported by former president
George Bush, a Republican, and sponsored by Sen.
Herb Kohl (D-Wis.). It was approved by a
Democratic-controlled Congress.
"We all know guns simply don't belong in
school," Clinton said, announcing that he had asked
Attorney General Janet Reno to produce for him
"what action I can take to keep guns away from
schoUl. I want the- acin+ to be constitutilf, but I
am determined to keep guns away from schools."
Despite intense political pressure, Clinton has
not backed away from efforts to control violence
through a variety of limits on firearms. He fought a
fierce battle last year to ban certain assault weapons,
a prohibition Republican congressional leaders have
pledged to lift. He also backed the Brady law
waiting period for purchasing certain firearms and
has used a variety of devices to keep guns out of the
schoolroom.
Last year, Congress approved a Clinton
proposal, the Gun-Free Schools Act, to require local
boards to adopt policies requiring schools to expel
for one year any student who brings a firearm to
school. Clinton gave the Education Department
authority to end or cut federal funds to schools that
do not comply. He also backed a provision in last
year's crime bill that makes it a federal crime for a
young person to carry a firearm except when
supervised by an adult.
Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger,
who heads the office of legal counsel, said the
Justice Department's view was that the Supreme
Court's ruling was a "relatively narrow decision.
That is, it does not appear to repudiate the Supreme
Court's prior decisions upholding broad federal
power to regulate the national economy and protect
the general welfare." Dellinger said the ruling did
not "cast doubt on Congress's ability to pass the
Brady Act or the Youth Handgun Safety Act."
Dellinger, who prepared a memorandum for
Reno on the matter, said there were "at least two
options that we are exploring" to deal with the high
courfs ruling. Under one, "Congress can amend the
act to restrict its application to those cases in which
the gun in question has moved in interstate or
foreign commerce," he said. In effect, the
amendment would allow enforcement in nearly all
cases, since the overwhelming majority of guns
cross state lines at some point.
"Second, we are exploring whether Congress
can use its spending power to encourage states to
adopt their own versions of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act," he said, "on the theory that federal
education funds are more effectively spent in schools
free from handgun violence." That approach has
been approved by the Supreme Court in numerous
cases. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the
Constitution, Congress has the power to "provide
for the common defense and general welfare."
The Supreme Court relied on that provision in
a 1987 ruling upholding Congress's power to
withhold federal highway funds from states that did
not raise the drinking age to 21.
Clinton yesterday spun an emotional link
between the Oklahoma City bombing, in which at
least 15 children died, and the need to offer further
protection against violence to the nation's
youngsters. He said Oklahoma reaffirmed the
nation's commitment to protect its children and a key
protection is to keep firearms away from the
schoolrooms where they spend their days. "I am
committed to doing everything in my power to make
schools places where young people can be safe," the
president said.
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Clinton broadly addressed what is the
fundamental legal argument used by conservatives
on the issue, that local school boards and local
parents, not the federal government, should
determine what laws and rules should apply to their
schools. He said the problem is a "national crisis"
that necessitates "a national effort to fight it,"
including local laws and intense actions by parents
and educators.
He said the problem is reaching crisis level,
citing the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention's Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
Survey, which said fear of violence in schools is
widespread and students are increasingly carrying
weapons or being threatened or injured with a
weapon on school property.
The 1994 survey on behavior in schools found
nearly one in 25 students said they missed a day of
school because of fear for their safety in or
commuting to or from school. It found one of 14
students said they were threatened or injured by a
weapon and nearly a fourth of students said they had
carried a weapon, including guns, knives or clubs,
with almost 8 percent saying they had carried a gun
in the 30 days preceding the survey.
In documents distributed by the White House,
the administration also cited the San Diego school
system to argue that "zero tolerance" -- expelling for
a year students possessing guns in school -- works
to reduce violence. In the 1993-94 school year, there
were 230 incidents of assaults with weapons in San
Diego schools, compared with 355 assaults with
weapons in the 1992-93 school year, the year before
the gun ban took effect. Weapons assaults this year
are declining further, San Diego reports.
'The number of high school students carrying
guns nationwide doubled in the past three years,
Clinton said, with the CDC identifying 105 violent
school-related deaths in the last two years. To reduce
that threat, Clinton said the country needs "a
seam ess web of safety that keeps guns out of the
hands of our children and out of our schools."
"We are going to find a way to ban guns inside
or near our schools," the president said, asserting he
was confident the Justice Department would find a
legal way to reverse the practical effect of the court
ruling.
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COURT STEPS AWAY FROM CRIME ISSUE
Copyright 1995 The Baltimore Sun Company
Tuesday, May 2, 1995
Lyle Denniston
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington - The Supreme Court sent a clear
message yesterday that it is not about to launch a
wholesale constitutional attack on Congress' power
to deal with crime - even crime that has only a local
connection.
Five days ago, the court sent a wave of anxiety
through Congress and the White House by striking
down a federal ban on guns near schools. By a 5-4
vote, the court said that carrying a gun in a school
zone was a crime too local for Congress to reach.
The justices seemed to put Congress on notice to
stick to crime with a clearly national impact.
Yesterday, in actions on three cases that might
have been sequels to last week's decision, the court
appeared to do just the reverse. In each, the court
rejected constitutional challenges that paralleled the
one that worked last week against the school-zone
gun ban.
As a result, prosecutions under the federal
anti-racketeering law and the federal arson law
withstood claims that the crimes were too local to be
the business of the federal government. The Clinton
administration - which was dealt a serious defeat in
the gun-control ruling last week -- prevailed in all
three actions yesterday.
The court did not appear to be reacting to the
heavy criticism it drew for last week's decision -
criticism that included a broadside complaint from
President Clinton about the threat to the safety of
schoolchildren.
Instead, the court was acting on cases that had
been on hold until after it issued the ruling in the
gun case.
Because the court's actions were so brief and
contained little or no explanation, it was not clear
why the justices decided to treat the new cases
differently. There was a clear contrast in the results,
however:
* In last week's ruling, the court's majority said
that a student's possession of a gun at school was
not a commercial activity and had no link to
commerce beyond the state where the boy had the
gun -- Texas. Thus, the majority ruled, the 1990
gun-possession law exceeded Congress' authority to
deal with crime under the Constitution's "commerce
clause."
Yesterday, there were these results:
* In a West Virginia arson case, the court voted
to leave intact a lower-court ruling that said the
burning of a mobile home could be prosecuted under
federal arson law, because the mobile home used
electricity drawn from an interstate power grid. The
trailer occupants' use of electricity may have been
only a pittance, the lower court said, but when
combined, all such uses would affect interstate
commerce.
* In a South Carolina case, the court declined to
disturb a lower court's decision that allowed the use
of the same federal arson law against three men for
burning down a house in Myrtle Beach to collect
insurance. The interstate connection: The house had
a telephone linked to long-distance lines and used
fuel from interstate gas pipelines, and it was covered
by a loan and insurance issued by interstate
companies.
* In an Alaska case, the court unanimously
struck down a lower-court ruling that the federal
anti-rackets law cannot be used when the only
connection the business has with interstate
commerce was that goods or people were moved
across state lines as part of the company's
operations.
The court said that the Justice Department had
produced enough proof of multistate movement of
goods, machinery and people to justify the federal
prosecution. The case involved a former federal
prosecutor in Los Angeles, Juan Paul Robertson,
who took up a career in narcotics dealing. He used
proceeds of his dealings to invest in a gold mine in
Alaska. Yesterday, the court ruled that the gold mine
had enough interstate links to qualify it as engaging
in interstate commerce -- and thus within the rackets
law's coverage.
That decision was unanimous.
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94-896 BMW OF NORTH AMERICA INC. v.
GORE
Punitive damages-Due process.
Ruling below (Ala SupCt, 8/19/94):
Evidence was sufficient to permit jury to award
$4,000 in compensatory damages for gross, mali-
cious, intentional, and wanton fraud in action by
car buyer against car manufacturer's North
American distributor after learning that new car,
for which buyer paid 540,000, had been partially
repainted prior to sale because of acid rain dam-
age to paint finish during transit from manufac-
turer's European plant to distributor's vehicle
preparation center in Georgia, despite distribu-
tor's contentions that it had good faith belief that
refinished vehicles suffer no diminution in value
and that its non-disclosure of repainting was in
accordance with its policy of not disclosing any
damage to dealer or customer if cost of repair, as
in this case, is less than three percent of manufac-
turer's suggested retail price; applying factors
outlined in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d
218 (Ala SupCt 1989). however, $4 million
award of punitive damages should be reduced to
$2 million, because punitive damage award was
based in large part on distributor's conduct in
other states of selling cars that incurred similar
damage without disclosing that it had made re-
pairs, and neither jury nor judge had evidence
before it showing in which states such conduct
was wrongful.
Questions presented: (1) Was Alabama Su-
preme Court, having found that jury's S4 million
punitive damages verdict unconstitutionally pun-
ished petitioner for hundreds of transactions that
occurred entirely outside of Alabama, obligated
to provide meaningful remedy for that constitu-
tional violation? (2) Is $2 million remitted puni-
tive exaction, which is 500 times compensatory
damages, grossly excessive in violation of Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/17/94, by An-
drew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Evan M. Tager,
and Mayer, Brown & Platt, all of Washington,
D.C., and Michael C. Quillen, Samuel M. Hill,
and Walston, Stabler, Wells, Anderson & Bains,
all of Birmingham, Ala.
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BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.
V.
Ira GORE, Jr.




Supreme Court of Alabama.
646 So.2d 619
Aug. 19, 1994.
Certiorari Granted Jan. 23, 1995. See 115 S.Ct. 932.
PER CURIAM.
The primary issues presented by these appeals are
(1) whether a German automobile manufacturer had
sufficient contacts with Alabama to permit the courts
of this state to exercise personal jurisdiction over it,
and (2) whether a jury's award of $4,000,000 in
punitive damages against the manufacturer and its
distributor is excessive.
The appeals are by BMW of North America, Inc.
("BMW NA"), and Bayerische Motoren Werke,
Aktiengesellschaft ("BMW AG") from a judgment
entered on ajury verdict awarding the plaintiff, Dr. Ira
Gore, Jr., compensatory damages of $4,000 and
punitive damages of $4,000,000. The specific issues
presented in regard to the excessiveness question are:
(1) Whether punitive damages were properly assessed,
and, if so, whether the amount of the award is
excessive; and (2) whether, without evidence that any
state other than Alabama requires disclosure of minor
cosmetic repairs by a manufacturer, the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that BMW NA had sold
983 vehicles throughout the country that had incurred
damage similar to that incurred by Gore's automobile
and that had been repaired without BMW NA's
disclosing that it had made repairs.
As to BMW NA, we have considered the oral
arguments of the parties and the briefs of the parties
and the amicus curiae briefs, and we have reviewed
the verdict. After thoroughly and carefully reviewing
the record and verdict, considering the gravity of the
wrong and the nature and extent of the injury inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and comparing the punitive
damages award in this case with other awards allowed
in similar cases involving the sale of automobiles, we
hold that the trial court's order denying BMW NA's
motion for a new trial is due to be affirmed on the
condition that the plaintiff file with this Court within
21 days a remittitur of damages of $2,000,000.
Otherwise, the judgment will be reversed and this
cause remanded for a new trial.
Facts
The plaintiff, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., bought a new
1990 BMW 535i automobile from German Auto, Inc.,
a Birmingham dealership, for $40,750.88. He had no
direct dealings with either BMW AG or BMW NA.
At the time of the sale, Dr. Gore, a graduate of
Harvard College and Duke Medical School, signed a
"Retail Buyers Order" and an "Acknowledgement of
Disclosure" in which he acknowledged that the
automobile might have sustained damage at some
point and that he had inspected it and had agreed to
accept it. This disclosure form did not list the repair
that is the subject of this action. Gore drove the car
for approximately nine months before taking it to
"Slick Finish," an independent automobile detailing
shop, to make the car look "snazzier than it normally
would appear," even though he was not unsatisfied
with the car's appearance and had not noticed any
flaws in the finish on the car.
The detailer informed Gore that the car had been
partially refinished; Gore later determined that the
refinishing had been done because of acid rain damage
to the car's paint finish sustained during transit
between BMW AG's manufacturing plant in Germany
and BMW NA's vehicle preparation center in
Brunswick, Georgia. BMW NA, the American
distributor of BMW automobiles, had adopted a
company policy that it would not disclose any damage
to a dealer or to a customer if the cost of repairing the
damage was less than three percent of the
manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP). The
cost of refinishing Gore's automobile was $601, less
than three percent of the MSRP; consequently, BMW
NA did not disclose that the automobile had been
refinished. The jury found that the damage devalued
the car by $4,000 or about 10 percent of the price
paid by Gore.
Upon his discovery that the automobile had been
refinished, Gore sued German Auto, BMW AG, and
BMW NA, alleging that the failure to disclose the
refinishing constituted fraud, suppression of a material
fact, and breach of contract With respect to the BMW
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defendants, only the suppression claim was submitted
to the jury. The jury returned a verdict against all
three defendants for $4,000 in compensatory damages,
and it assessed $4,000,000 in punitive damages
against the BMW defendants jointly, based on a
determination that the BMW defendants had been
guilty of gross, malicious, intentional, and wanton
fraud. The trial court entered a judgment on that
verdict and subsequently denied post-judgment
motions filed by the BMW defendants, after reviewing
the verdict under the Hammond and Green Oil
standards. The BMW defendants appealed.
IV
BMW NA's chief argument is that the punitive
damages award is excessive. . .because: (1) the award
of punitive damages is 1,000 times the award of
compensatory damages and bears no reasonable
relationship to the risk of harm, which is purely
economic; (2) BMW NA's conduct was much less
reprehensible than that of defendants in other cases in
which juries made much smaller damages awards; (3)
it did not profit from its nondisclosure, because
German Auto paid full price for the car; (4) the fact
that it has a substantial net worth does not alone
justify an exorbitant award; and (5) Gore never tried
to resolve the matter without resorting to litigation.
We now review the jury verdict and the judgment
entered by the trial court with those factors in mind,
saving for last a discussion of whether the punitive
damages award bears a reasonable relationship to the
harm actually caused or likely to be caused by the
defendant.
The Reprehensibility of the Defendant's Conduct
In determining the degree of reprehensibility of
BMW NA's conduct, we have considered the duration
of that conduct, the degree of BMW NA's awareness
of any hazard that its conduct caused or was likely to
cause, any concealment or "cover-up" of that hazard,
and the existence and frequency of similar past
conduct. All are relevant in determining the degree of
reprehensibility.
BMW NA argues that there is no evidence that its
adoption of the nondisclosure policy was "gross,
oppressive or malicious." It says that it adopted the
nondisclosure policy in good faith and it presented
evidence that it followed industry custom in the
nondisclosure of repairs such as those involved in this
case. Gore, on the other hand, contends that BMW
NA consciously adopted the nondisclosure policy at a
time when it knew that the law of 35 states would
have required disclosure of this material fact. As this
case shows, this jury and another jury thought the
"cost of repair" policy did not correspond with actual
diminution in value.
The evidence shows that BMW adopted the
policy of nondisclosure in 1983 and that the policy
applied to the sale of all automobiles in all states.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that Gore
satisfactorily proved that BMW NA engaged in a
pattern and practice of knowingly failing to disclose
damage to new cars, even though the damage affected
their value, and that BMW NA followed this policy
for several years. Based on that evidence, we
conclude the Gore satisfied the burden placed on him
to show that BMW NA's conduct was reprehensible.
Was the Conduct Profitable to BMW NA?
The next issue we address is whether the conduct
was profitable to BMW NA. The evidence shows that
it was. In fact, the jury awarded Gore $4,000 in
compensatory damages.
One of the purposes for assessing punitive
damages is to remove the profit resulting from a fraud
or misrepresentation. Punitive damages should be in
excess of the profit, so that the wrongdoer recognizes
a loss. We find that the evidence was legally
sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion;
therefore, it was ajury question whether that evidence
produced "in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim
and a high probability as to the correctness of the
conclusion."
The Financial Position of BMW NA
It is clear from the evidence that the $4 million
judgment would not have a substantial impact upon
BMW NA's financial position.
The Costs of the Litigation
In reviewing whether a particular punitive
damages award is excessive, the public policy of this
state is to consider the costs of litigation and to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial. In
our review of this verdict we have considered the fact
that the costs associated with this trial were
substantial. We have given due consideration to that
fact, in keeping with our application of the Hammond
and Green Oil factors.
Criminal Sanctions
If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the
defendant for the conduct made the basis for the award
of punitive damages, Hammond and Green Oil require
that this fact be taken into account in mitigation of the
punitive damages award. No criminal sanctions have
been imposed on BMW NA for this conduct.
The Reasonable Relationship Factor
Did the punitive damages award bear a
reasonable relationship to the harm that was likely to
occur from the defendant's conduct as well as to the
harm that actually occurred? Was the actual or likely
harm slight, or was it grievous?
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It seems apparent from the record that the jury's
punitive damages award is based upon a
multiplication of $4,000 (the diminution in value of
the Gore vehicle) times 1,000 (approximately the
number of refinished vehicles sold in the United
States).
Based on these facts and the testimony taken at
the post-trial hearing on the excessiveness issue, we
must conclude that the award of punitive damages was
based in large part on conduct that happened in other
jurisdictions. This, BMW NA argues, is a violation
of BMW's due process rights and encroaches upon the
sovereignty of other states. Although evidence of
similar acts in other jurisdictions is admissible as to
the issue of a "pattern and practice" of such acts, this
jury could not use the number of similar acts that a
defendant has committed in other jurisdictions as a
multiplier when determining the dollar amount of a
punitive damages award. Such evidence may not be
considered in setting the size of the civil penalty,
because neither the jury nor the trial court had
evidence before it showing in which states the conduct
was wrongful.
This Court has recognized that evidence of
adherence to industry practice bears importance on the
question whether the defendant has acted in good faith
and is therefore not subject to exemplary damages.
This Court has also held that a manufacturer that
in good faith repairs a vehicle to "new" specifications
should not be found to have engaged in the type of
conduct giving rise to punitive damages. This Court
has further held that a vehicle with superficial
cosmetic damage, including scratches in the paint and
unmatched and uneven paint, was "new" as a matter of
law, and on that holding affirmed a judgment based on
a directed verdict against a plaintiff claiming fraud.
While reviewing the verdict in this case, we have
considered the principles of law contained in these
other Alabama cases.
[We find a reasonable relationship between the
jury's decision to award punitive damages and the
number of times BMW NA had engaged in similar
conduct, and we find no error in the admission of the
evidence that showed how pervasive the nondisclosure
policy was and the intent behind BMW NA's adoption
of it. However, as we discuss below, when applying
the reasonable relationship test to the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded in this case, we do
not consider those acts that occurred in other
jurisdictions.
The determination of a proper award of punitive
damages ultimately turns on the jury's determination
of the facts warranting their imposition. Our law
governing this Court's deference to the jury's
factfinding prerogative is long settled:
When a jury is the trier of fact, it is not for the
trial judge, nor an appellate court, to attempt to
determine with mathematical certainty that all of
the various elements of evidence offered by the
parties regarding specific costs and credits
precisely equal the amount of the jury's verdict.
We do not have trial by computer, nor do we have
post-trial, or appellate review by the computer.
The reviewing court does not substitute its own
judgment as to the amount of damages for that of
the trier of fact.
After thoroughly and painstakingly reviewing this
jury award in light of the factors discussed above, we
hold that a constitutionally reasonable punitive
damages award in this case is $2,000,000, and that a
remittitur of the $4 million jury verdict is appropriate.
Therefore, the trial court's order denying BMW NA's
motion for a new trial is affirmed on the condition that
the plaintiff file with this Court within 21 days a
remittitur of damages in the sum of $2,000,000;
otherwise, the judgment will be reversed and this
cause remanded for a new trial as to the defendant
BMW NA.
Justice HOUSTON concurring separately.
[Omitted]
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GORE VS. BMW FUELS BOTH SIDES' POSITIONS
Anniston Star
Copyright Anniston Star 1995
Sunday, April 30, 1995
Frederick Burger
Anniston, AL -- When Dr. Ira Gore Jr. of
Birmingham plunked down $40,700 for his new black
BMW 535i in January 1990, little did he know that
two years later he would land in the middle of
Alabama's raging tort reform debate.
Doctors, after all, have been on the front line
demanding that limitations be placed on what they
consider to be nuisance medical malpractice lawsuits.
They also-want caps on punitive-damage awards,
which are intended to punish and halt improper
practices.
"rm certainly a paradoxical plaintiff," says Gore,
37, a cancer doctor at Birmingham's St. Vincent's
Hospital, who spoke on the record for the first time
since the controversy engulfed him.
Indeed, he has become something of a dart-board
target boy for efforts to restrict the state's civil liability
laws. To Alabama's seething business community,
Gore is a symbol. He filed a lawsuit in Jefferson
County and won a huge--$4 million-punitive damage
award against BMW of North American.
"In my opinion, I don't think he should have
gotten any punitive damages," says George Clark,
executive vice president of the Business Council of
Alabama, one of the state's chief advocates of tort
reform.
The Alabama Supreme Court cut the $4 million
verdict to $2 million. BMW has appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing the reduced award is
unconstitutionally excessive. Oral arguments are to
take place in October. A ruling is expected sometime
next year.
Meanwhile, Gore awaits a final ruling. But the
experience has altered his view of the tort reform
debate.
Gore concedes: "If the facts associated with my
case had been presented to me six, seven years ago
before any of this started, on the basis of the tort
reform propaganda that is being played out, I
immediately would have said, 'What a ludicrous jury
award,' and jumped on the tort reform bandwagon,
which I was already on.
"This has been a real education to me. Now it's
much more difficult for me to say what is right and
what is wrong in a tort situation. . .Now I realize these
lawsuits do offer some protection under the law. How
you go about setting limits to such protection, I'm not
so certain of anymore."
The facts of Gore's case are simple enough, and
they focus on his car's paint job.
A graduate of Harvard and Duke's medical
school, Gore took great pride in his new car. Once or
twice a month he washed his car himself. After driving
it for nine months, he took the car to a detail shop
owned by Leonard Slick to have it cleaned.
When Gore returned to get his car, Slick had
something to tell him.
His $40,700 driving machine had not been
pristine when he bought it. In fact, all the flat surfaces
-the hood, trunk and roof -had been repainted. BMW
later would say the repainting was required because of
damage suffered when the car was shipped from
Germany.
Under the intense fluorescent lights of Slick's
detail shop, Gore could see the tape marks from the
repaint job. He immediately concluded he had been
taken. He didn't call the dealer, German Auto, or
BMW. Slick said he knew a lawyer who had sued
over such matters.
Gore called the attorney, A.W. Bolt of Anniston.
In April 1990, only about six months before Gore
called, Bolt had filed suit in Birmingham for Dr.
Thomas T. Yates Jr, a dentist and Bolt's cousin,
charging that BMW fraudulently sold him a damaged
car that had been repainted.
In April 1992, a Birmingham Circuit Court jury
awarded Yates $4,600 in actual damages. No more.
The story was drastically different when Gore's
crase went to trial two months later
The jury awarded Gore $4,000 in actual damages.
Testimony from the dealer said the repaint job had
reduced the actual value of the car by 10 percent. In
other words, Gore unknowingly paid $4,000 more
than what it was worth.
From the start BMW argued that the repainting
had restored the car to factory standards and had not
diminished its value.
What outrages many in the business community
was the rest of the Gore verdict: $4 million in punitive
damages against BMW of North America, the U.S.
arm of the German manufacturer, and the
manufacturer itself Bayerische Motoren Werke AG of
Munich.
The difference between Yates' case and Gore's,
Bolt says, was that by the time Gore's complaint came
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to trial, he was able to prove that BMW had partially
repainted and sold at full price hundreds--probably
thousands--of other cars at full price.
What outraged Gore was that he felt he had been
deceived and cheated.
"I've been very disturbed that I've been portrayed
as the bad guy," Gore says. "The focus has been taken
away from BMW, which was systematically deceiving
people and concealing it. At some point, if we as a
society feel such deception is an inappropriate
business practice, we need to do something to stop it.
Apparently this (filing a civil lawsuit) is the only
means we have at our disposal, unless we want to beef
up the watchdog activity of the prosecutor's (district
attorney's) office."
To most people, who can't afford a $40,000 car,
the Gore case does sound somewhat trivial. But it
clearly illuminates key points raised in the two-sided
tort-reform debate.
Business interests target trial lawyers such as Bolt
as prime examples of how the system has run amok.
Was he gambling on a big score by suing BMW,
or was he simply defending the rights of a consumer
by representing Gore?
Probably both. After all, Bolt took both the Yates
and Gore cases on a contingency. The deal, the kind
the business community detests, worked this way:
Bolt and what has become an army of 10 other
attorneys would bear all the expenses of the suits. In
return, the lawyers would receive 50 percent of
whatever they ultimately win in court.
Bolt calls it a "highly speculative investment" of
time and effort. He estimates the two cases have cost
him and colleagues $200,000 in out-of-pocket
expenses, plus what he figures to be $1 million in
time fighting BMW's attorneys to develop the facts.
Bolt is quick to point out that the attorneys have
been working five years.
Business interests propose drastically curtailing
the contingency fee system, arguing it encourages
"frivolous" lawsuits. One proposal is to limit lawyers
to 10 percent of some of what they collect and 5
percent of the rest. The bulk of the punitive damages
would go to the state.
After all, business interests argue, the idea is to
punish a wrongdoer monetarily and halt an improper
practice, not create a windfall for plaintiffs like Gore
and attorneys like Bolt.
Critics of those limitations, however, argue that
they would take away the economic incentives for
lawyers to take important cases. More importantly,
they assert that such restrictions would deprive
common folks of their ability to sue and correct a
wrong.
"Basically," says Gadsden trial lawyer Greg
Cusimano "the idea is if you can take the lawyer our
of the picture, you don't even have to take the rights
away from people, because they have no way to
exercise them."
If tort reforms being debated in Congress and the
Legislature had been in effect, Gore could have
collected on the $4,000 in actual damages and three
times that in punitive damages.
Critics say those changes in the law would make
it economically unfeasible for people like Gore to sue
a corporation like BMW. And the trial lawyers say a
$16,000 total award in Gore's case would hardly be
enough to get the attention of the German automaker's
upper management and change the practice.
The arguments rage back and forth, but Ira Gore
says he is pleased with the way his case turned out.
Not because of the potential money, which is still tied
up in the courts, but because he thinks his jury award
forced BMW to change its disclosure policy on
repaired cars.
Since 1983 BMW had a written policy not to
disclose to consumers repairs made to its "new" cars.
Now the company discloses every repair, however
small, to prospective customers.
"Certainly we took it (the Gore verdict) into
consideration, but (changing) the policy had been
under consideration for some time," says Rich Brooks,
a BMW spokesman. "In the interest of better service
and protecting our customers, we decided to disclose
all damages. The timing was coincidental."
Gore, who declined to have his picture taken for
this story, still has his black BMW, but the pride is
gone. He doesn't wash it anymore. And his wife traded
the BMW she drove and bought a Lexus.
Bolt hopes to pursue a class-action suit for
hundreds of other BMW owners he discovered also
bought repainted cars, but that's on hold until the U.S.
Supreme Court rules on the Gore case.
Meanwhile, Ira Gore's black-and-white view of
tort reform now has assumed a new color: gray.
"I certainly agree there are frivolous lawsuits out
there and they clog the courts," Gore says. "But how
do you separate the wheat from the chaff?
"When you get down to it, tort reform is a
difficult issue. This isn't something where you can
straight-forward say these tort reform advocates are
nuts, or that the trial lawyers are simply self- serving.
But you've got to think seriously before you tamper
with a system that has shown some success over the
years."
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THE CASE OF THE $4 MILLION BMW
Award to Owner of Repainted Car Is at Heart of Punitive Damages Debate
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Monday, May 29, 1995
Joan Biskupic
Washington Post Staff Writer
To understand why many federal lawmakers
believe punitive damages awards are out of control,
take the case of Ira Gore Jr. and his new black BMW.
Gore's BMW has become a popular symbol of
America's litigiousness and high jury awards, like the
scalding cup of coffee that led initially to a $2.7
million judgment against McDonald's. While far from
typical examples of personal injury lawsuits, they
shape the debate over how to change the country's
civil justice system.
What is at stake are claims by injured people
against product manufacturers and other businesses,
and the big-money judgments the claims sometimes
produce. For consumers, the courts can be the last
resort for relief and compensation. But for businesses,
state juries can be fickle, arbitrary and financially
ruinous.
House and Senate conferees will try to reconcile
those competing interests this summer as they hash
out divergent bills intended to impose a national
standard for personal injury disputes.
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has agreed to
review whether Gore's case crossed the line of
constitutionality.
In 1990, Gore, a physician in Birmingham,
brought his new BMW 535i four-door to a detailing
shop for a "snazzier" look. The shop, Slick Finish,
discovered the car had been partly repainted before it
was sold to Gore. Gore later found out the refinishing
was necessary becase the car was am-aged by _AciL,%..u.L.ui,..~.aJvv a a a. a~u U' aLIu
rain on its way from the German manufacturer to the
U.S. distributor.
Gore sued BMW, and an Alabama jury awarded
him $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million
in punitive damages. ("Punitive damages" refer to
money awards over actual damages or compensation
for pain and suffering. They are intended to punish
malicious and willful misconduct.)
The Alabama jury found BMW guilty of fraud for
failing to tell Gore about the paint job, and it based
the punitive damages on BMW's sale of an estimated
1,000 touched-up cars nationwide as new.
The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the jury
verdict against BMW of North America but cut
punitive damages to $2 million.
"I defy any member of this [Senate] to read the
opinion in this case and tell the American people that
justice was done," Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) said
during floor debate this month.
"Go ahead and cite your two or three little cases
that sound outrageous," countered Sen. Ernest F.
Hollings (D-S.C.).
The bill eventually passed by the Senate -- after a
two-week deadlock and the fractious defeat of
proposals by Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.)
- would cap punitive damages only in cases of faulty
products, excluding fraud cases such as Gore's and
many other disputes where punitive damages are far
higher than actual damages.
The House version passed earlier would limit
punitive damages in all civil cases and prohibit them
for manufacturers of drugs and medical devices that
had been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration.
Andrew Frey, whose law fin is defending
numerous companies hit with punitive damages,
including BMW, said punitive damages have "a
disproportionate impact" even though they are
awarded in a small percentage of civil cases.
"Punitive damages are stigmatizing," he said.
"The best corporate citizen worries about them." The
business community argues that baseless litigation
and unsettling jury awards prevent companies from
offering worthwhile products and remaining
competitive in the marketplace.
Jonathan Massey, who like Frey is an expert in
punitive damages legal issues but who is helping
represent Gore, acknowledged some people might
think Gore did not deserve a multimillion-dollar
windfall, no matter what BMW did to car buyers
nationwide.
"But the system looks at punitive damages from
the point of view of the defendant," he said. "The
rationale is: What amount is necessary to punish the
defendant? You want to give the plaintiff adequate
incentive to bring the lawsuit against the defendant. It
is like winning the lottery, but society is better off
because presumably harmful policies become
changed."
Some consumer interest groups and plaintiffs'
lawyers believe regulation of punitive damages should
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be left to state lawmakers, to be considered with
product safety rules and other measures to keep unsafe
products off the market. In Gore's case, the state
Supreme Court noted Alabama had no consumer
protection law to help car buyers in cases of
undisclosed defects.
Cases like the McDonald's hot coffee dispute
have drawn attention to punitive damages even though
the burned woman's punitive damages were cut by a
judge to $480,000 and the case was settled later.
BMW v. Gore, expected to be argued in October
with a ruling by next spring, will test whether a
punitive damages award can violate the Constitution's
protection against loss of property without the "due
process of law."
BMW contends its due process guarantee was
violated in two key ways: when it was punished by an
Alabama jury for transactions outside the state, and
because the fine was "grossly excessive . . . a
breathtaking 500 times the actual and potential harm
allegedly suffered by Dr. Gore."
[The Washington Post has joined several media
organizations in a "friend of the court" brief on the
side of BMW. The media brief notes the threat of
punitive damages in libel lawsuits and asks the court
to provide clearer guidance for juries.]
Gore stresses the case is about a "corporate policy
. . . whereby BMW intentionally decided to not
disclose to dealers, consumers or anyone the fact that
repairs or repaintings were done by BMW to
supposedly new cars."
BMW's policy had been not to reveal repairs




Supreme Court Tackles Hot-Button Issue in Dispute over Court Award
Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin Cities
Saturday, July 22, 1995
Richard Carelli
Associated Press
Call it the case of the $2 million BMW. It's one of
the most closely watched disputes in the Supreme
Court's decision hopper.
The BMW's manufacturer ended up owing that
much to an Alabama doctor, who sued after learning
that the dealer who sold him the car had done
touch-up work on the body to repair shipping damage.
American businesses, in a flurry of unsolicited
legal advice delivered to the nation's highest court,
call it the next best chance to rein in the huge
punitive-damages awards that so enrage them.
Such awards, aimed at punishing or deterring
misconduct, have grown too large and are unfair, the
justices were told in numerous friend-of-the-court
briefs.
Consumer advocates argued that large awards
help keep dangerous products off the market and
protect the public from corporate greed.
Congress may upstage the high court. Negotiators
are trying to reconcile differing bills passed by the
House and Senate that would limit punitive-damage
awards, at least in product-liability cases and perhaps
in all personal-injury lawsuits.
It is unclear, however, whether Congress will act
before the Supreme Court. If not, billions of dollars
could be riding on the court's decision, expected
sometime next year.
But let's get back to the $2 million car.
Dr. Ira Gore Jr., a cancer specialist from
Birmingham, said he didn't get his money's worth
when he hought ai ne BMW sedan fr TA 1 0A The
car had been partly repainted to touch up some
scratches incurred during shipping.
No one told Gore. At the time, BMW made such
disclosures to dealers and customers only if the costs
of repairs exceeded a certain percentage of a car's
suggested retail price.
So Gore sued BMW of North America after
learning about the touch-up nine months later.
An Alabama jury awarded Gore $4,000 to
compensate for the financial injury he had suffered,
and then added $4 million in punitive damages. State
courts reduced the $4 million to $2 million.
BMW of North America appealed, and the
Supreme Court last January accepted the case - its
fourth review of punitive damages since 1991.
That year, the court ruled that some such awards
might be so far removed from the actual harm that
they are unconstitutional. But the 1991 ruling stopped
short of offering any type of formula for lower courts
to use in determining how much is too much.
In a 1993 decision, the court upheld a $10 million
award that rang in 526 times larger than the $19,000
in actual damages caused by the misconduct.
Last year, the court took its first step to limit
punitive-damages awards when it ruled in an Oregon
case that states cannot bar judges from reducing
awards they think are excessive.
The ruling gives BMW and its allies hope for a
bigger victory next year.
The National Association of Manufacturers, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers and American Council of Life
Insurance are among those who have filed briefs
supporting BMW's constitutional arguments.
Among their arguments:
- A state court cannot base punitive damages on
a defendant's conduct outside that state.
- Allowing such liability unfairly opens a
defendant to being punished numerous times for the
same alleged misconduct.
- The $2 million award is excessive.
One of the briefs backing BMWs appeal was filed
on behalf of news organizations, including the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Association
of American Publishers and National Association of
Broadcasters.
News media lawyers contend that punitive
damages in libel cases are becoming larger and more
frequent and that some help is needed to protect
free-speech rights.
In all, 18 friend-of-the-court briefs support BMW;
four support Gore.
Arthur F. McEvoy III, a University of Wisconsin
legal historian, has urged the court to uphold Gore's
victory and leave punitive damages "as an important
tool for guarding against abuses by the powerful
against the powerless."
He said such awards are needed when
compensatory damages "will not be enough to deter
misconduct or to adequately register social disapproval
of it."
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94-818 HERCULES INC. v. U.S.
Agent Orange-Indemnification of manufacturers
by government.
Ruling below (CA FC, 24 F.3d 188):
Manufacturers that, pursuant to government
contracts they were required to enter under De-
fense Production Act, produced defoliant known
as Agent Orange in accordance with formula and
specifications provided by government are not
entitled to indemnification from government for
sums they contributed to fund established in
connection with settlement of class action
brought by Agent Orange exposure victims, attor-
neys' fees, or litigation expenses.
Questions presented: (1) If government com-
pels manufacture of product by private compa-
nies, product is known to government to be poten-
tially dangerous, and use by government of
product causes manufacturers to incur liability,
may government claim immunity from conse-
quences of its conduct? (2) Does government
contractor defense to tort claims created in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988), preclude breach of contract claims
against United States that otherwise are permissi-
ble in accordance with U.S. v. Spearin. 248 U.S.
132 (1918)? (3) May government compel govern-
ment contractors to produce hazardous products
(such as Agent Orange) pursuant to Defense
Production Act, and then avoid all contractual
liability for damages suffered by contractors
when they subsequently are sued in tort actions
by third parties allegedly harmed by these
products?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/4/94, by Carter
G. Phillips. Sidley & Austin, James S. Turner,
Swankin & Turner, Gregory W. Homer, Rhonda
D. Orin, and Anderson Kill Olick & Oshinsky, all
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The following facts are not in dispute:
A. Historical
In the mid to late 1960s, Hercules and Thompson
were members of a group of chemical companies that
manufactured Agent Orange for the United States
military.... The military used Agent Orange during
the Vietnam War to defoliate large areas of forest so
that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops could
not hide beneath the foliage from view of aircraft. The
military mixed the Agent Orange produced by the
various chemical companies and stored the mixture in
large drums. During the relevant period, the
government and the military had considerable
knowledge of hazards associated with 2,4,5-T and
dioxin.
Hercules. . .produced Agent Orange for the
government between May 8, 1964, and May 20, 1968,
pursuant to fifteen separate contracts. The military
suppleAd tfh formula and specifications for
manufacturing Agent Orange, with which Hercules
complied. In 1965, Hercules learned of the health
risks associated with 2,4,5-T and changed its method
of production to eliminate dioxin from its product.
From 1966 to 1970, Hercules' product was not
measurably contaminated with dioxin.
Thompson. . .originally declined to bid on the
government's solicitation to chemical manufacturers
for the production of Agent Orange. In due course,
however, the government invoked the DPA and
required Thompson to supply Agent Orange pursuant
to two contracts dated April 19, 1967, and May 24,
1968. Between September 1967 and January 1969,
Thompson supplied Agent Orange to the military.
There is no evidence that Thompson was aware of the
health risks associated with Agent Orange. As in the
case of Hercules, the government provided the formula
and specifications for Agent Orange without any input
from Thompson.
B. The Agent Orange Litigation
Starting in 1979, numerous tort actions were filed
by Vietnam veterans and their families against the
various chemical manufacturers who produced Agent
Orange for the government, including Hercules and
Thompson. The tort actions alleged that the veterans'
exposure to dioxin contained in Agent Orange
produced by the chemical companies had caused
various health problems for the plaintiffs, such as
cancer, miscarriages, and birth defects. The court
certified a class comprising all veterans claiming
injuries who had served in or near Vietnam between
1961 and 1972.... The certified class also included
the veterans' spouses, parents, and children (born
before January 1, 1984) directly or derivatively injured
as a result of the veterans' exposure.
On May 7, 1984, the date that trial would have
begun in the class action suit, the parties reached a
settlement. The settlement called for the creation of a
$18 milio setleentfund, wiheach defndant
contributing to the fund in proportion to its percentage
of the total volume of Agent Orange produced, with a
factor for the level of dioxin in the particular
manufacturer's product. Hercules' share of the
settlement was about ten percent, valued at
$18,772,568. Thompson's share was around two
percent, amounting to $3,096,597. In its opinion
approving the settlement, the district court noted that
the plaintiffs would have had extreme difficulty
proving that their injuries resulted from exposure to
dioxin present in the Agent Orange.
C. The Claims Court Proceedings
In 1990, Hercules and Thompson each brought an
action in the Claims Court against the United States,
seeking (i) indemnification for their respective
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contributions to the settlement fund in the 1984 class
action settlement, and (ii) legal fees and expenses
incurred in the Agent Orange litigation. The actions
were grounded in Hercules' and Thompson's
respective contracts with the government for the
production of Agent Orange.
Under each of its different theories of liability,
Hercules alleged that the government's breach of its
contractual obligations caused Hercules to sustain
increased expenses of performance and incur
substantial money damages in connection with the
Agent Orange cases and that Hercules was entitled to
contractual indemnification therefor.
In each case the government moved to dismiss the
complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment as a matter of law. The Claims Court
granted the government's motions for summary
judgment and dismissed both cases. In so ruling, the
court held that the superior knowledge doctrine only
applied in situations where the government possessed
vital knowledge that affected contract "performance
costs or duration of performance." Because Hercules'
and Thompson's increased costs were the result of
post-performance litigation and were not connected to
contract performance, the Claims Court concluded, the
superior knowledge doctrine could not be expanded to
encompass their claims. Id. Similarly, the Claims
Court found that Hercules' good faith theory could not
withstand summary judgment because it was "another
performance- related doctrine" that could not be
extended to matters occurring "at some distant point
in the future" after contract performance.
DISCUSSION
B. Appellants' Contentions
On appeal, Hercules contends that because
disputed issues of material fact exist, the Claims
Court committed reversible error by granting summary
judgment with respect to its contractual claims based
upon the theories of superior knowledge, reverse
warranty, and an implied warranty of specifications.
Thompson also contends that the existence of disputed
material facts precluded summary judgment with
respect to its contractual claims based upon the
theories of superior knowledge and an implied
warranty of specifications. Thompson further
contends that the Claims Court erred as a matter of
law in holding (i) that an implied-in-fact contractual
obligation for indemnity did not arise under the DPA,
and (ii) that such a term-assuming it did arise--would
be barred by the Anti-Deficiency Act. Lastly, both
Hercules and Thompson contend that the Claims
Court erred in holding that the government contractor
defense provided a "separate and independent" basis
for denial of their claims.
We have carefully considered all of appellants'
arguments on appeal. Having found no errors of law,
nor any genuine issues of material fact, we conclude
that the Claims Court correctly decided each of the
contract based claims asserted by Hercules and
Thompson. We affirm the judgments of the Claims
Court on that basis and do not reach the issue of
whether the government contractor defense would
provide a "separate and independent" basis for the
court's decision. As will be seen, however, the
presence of the government contractor defense is
dispositive of two of the contract based claims




Hercules and Thompson each argue that because
the government had superior knowledge of the dangers
associated with dioxin, it had a contractual obligation
to inform them of such dangers. Because the
government failed to do so, they contend, the
government breached its contractual obligation. ...
Hercules and Thompson each argue that summary
judgment on this point was improperly granted
because disputed factual issues remain concerning
whether the type of damages they suffered were
"foreseeable.". . . Hercules further argues that a
disputed factual issue exists regarding the relative
levels of knowledge about the hazards of Agent
Orange. These alleged disputed issues, however, are
immaterial to our decision. Even assuming, arguendo,
that (i) Hercules' and Thompson's damages were
foreseeable, and (ii) the government had superior
knowledge of the hazards associated with dioxin, such
foreseeability and knowledge had no bearing on
Hercules' and Thompson's performance under the
contract-i.e., production costs or manufacturing
times. Put another way, nothing the government did
Or fI'ailed to Uo had any impact upon Hercules' and
Thompson's production of Agent Orange. As the
Claims Court noted, the cases cited for the superior
knowledge doctrine concern the withholding of
superior knowledge that makes it more difficult to
perform under the terms of the contract at issue. We
decline to accept Hercules' and Thompson's invitation
to extend the doctrine of superior knowledge to
encompass their claims for post-performance
settlement and litigation expenses, because those
expenses were not incurred during the performance of
the underlying contracts.
2. The Implied Warranty of Specifications
In the present case, Hercules and Thompson argue
that because the government supplied the
specifications and formula for Agent Orange, the
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government is liable for their injuries by reason of the
breach of an implied warranty of specifications, even
though the alleged harm (i.e., costs incurred in the
Agent Orange litigation) occurred several years after
completion of the Agent Orange production contracts.
Both Hercules and Thompson contend that summary
judgment was improperly granted because various
factual issues remain in dispute with regard to their
claims, including (i) whether an implied warranty
arose out of the contracts, (ii) whether the type of
damages sought were "reasonably foreseeable" at the
time the contracts were formed, (iii) whether, leaving
aside the government contractor defense, Hercules and
Thompson faced potential liability in the Agent
Orange litigation, (iv) whether the government knew
that Hercules and Thompson faced potential liability,
(v) whether the government's defective specifications
gave rise to their alleged potential liability, and (vi)
whether the class action settlement constituted
reasonable conduct in light of the potential liability.
We need not, however, resolve the above factual
issues because a necessary element of appellants'
breach of warranty claims--i.e., causation--is lacking.
As noted above, to make out a prima facie case of
breach of an implied warranty of specifications,
Hercules and Thompson must show not only that the
facts support an implied warranty, but also that the
warranty was breached and that their damages were
caused by the breach. As seen above, as far as
damages to the extent of contributions to the Agent
Orange settlement fund are concerned, the Claims
Court held that Hercules' and Thompson's claims
failed because (i) the absence of scientific evidence
regarding the consequences of dioxin exposure
precluded a finding that the warranty was breached,
(ii) even assuming the existence of an implied
warranty of specifications, the warranty would not
include the kind of indemnity sought here, and (iii) the
availability of the government contractor defense
precluded a finding that their damages were caused by
the alleged breach. We agree with the Claims Court
that the record from the Agent Orange litigation is
sarmse wvith respect to scientific proof that the
veterans' injuries were caused by dioxin. We also
agree with the Claims Court that the facts would have
to be stretched to support the theory that, under an
implied warranty of specifications, Hercules and
Thompson would be entitled to recover from the
government their contributions to the Agent Orange
settlement fund. However, we prefer to rest our
decision on the third ground articulated by the court:
Hercules and Thompson cannot prove that their
damages were caused by the government's alleged
breach of an implied warranty of specifications
because they were protected from liability to the Agent
Orange plaintiffs by the government contractor
defense.
Because the government contractor defense
provided a complete defense to the veterans' tort
claims, it cannot be said that the damages asserted by
Hercules and Thompson were caused by the
government, as the Claims Court recognized. As far
as their contributions to the settlement fund are
concerned ($18,772,568 in the case of Hercules and
$3,096,597 in the case of Thompson), it was
appellants' voluntary decision to enter into the
settlement that led to those damages. The government
did nothing to encourage or compel Hercules and
Thompson to settle. It was appellants' decision to
forego litigating the issue of the government
contractor defense to completion that caused them to
incur the monetary injury of the contribution to the
settlement fund.
3. Reverse Warranty
Hercules argues that the government had an
implied-in-fact contractual obligation to use the Agent
Orange produced by it in a manner so as to avoid both
potential risks to servicemen and the subsequent tort
suits against appellants. A material issue of fact
exists, Hercules asserts, as to whether this obligation
arose when the government ordered Hercules to
package Agent Orange in drums marked only with an
orange band, thus precluding Hercules from applying
the extensive warnings and instructions normally
placed on its commercial herbicides. According to
Hercules, because it was not permitted to place
adequate warnings on the Agent Orange containers,
the government thereby warranted to Hercules that the
government's use of the product would take into
account the absence of warnings and instructions
designed to assure the product's safe use.
Alternatively, Hercules asserts that a material issue of
fact exists as to whether the government's mixing of
Hercules' dioxin-free Agent Orange with
dioxin-tainted Agent Orange imposed potential
liability on Hercules that otherwise would not have
existed. In so mixing, Hercules argues, the
government assumed obligations that properly include
compensating it for liabilities incurred as a result of
SUCH conduct. Hlercules filrther contends. that courts
have recognized the existence of an implied-in-fact
warranty running from the purchaser to the seller
where the purchaser has engaged in conduct which
warrants the imposition of a duty to exercise due care
in using a seller's product. The Claims Court
characterized Hercules' claim as being based on a
"reverse warranty" theory.
4. Implied-in-fact Contractual Obligation to
Indemnify
On appeal, Thompson contends that under the
circumstances of the compelled production here,
section 707 of the DPA operated to create an
implied-in-fact obligation on the part of the
government to indemnify Thompson for the damages
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it incurred: its contribution to the Agent Orange
settlement fund and the expenses which it incurred in
the Agent Orange litigation. Thompson argues that the
Claims Court erred in accepting the reasoning of the
district court. Specifically, Thompson contends that
because section 101 of the DPA authorizes the
President to compel contract performance as well as
contract acceptance, the "risk imposed" is not limited
to breach of contract actions arising out of preference
given to DPA contracts, but rather extends to possible
tort suits by third parties arising from subsequent use
of the product produced under the DPA contract.
We disagree. As did the district court in the
Agent Orange litigation and the Claims Court in this
suit, we read section 707 of the DPA as providing a
defense for a DPA contractor against a suit by a
non-government customer in the event that the DPA
contractor is forced to breach another contract to fulfill
the government's requirements. Section 707 does not
provide the kind of protection asserted by Thompson.
In sum, the protection afforded by section 707 of
the DPA extends no further than the risk imposed by
section 101(a) of the DPA. Accordingly, invocation
of the DPA by the government for the production of
Agent Orange did not give rise to an implied-in-fact
contractual obligation on the part of the government to
indemnify Thompson for its contribution to the Agent
Orange settlement fund or for the expenses which
Thompson incurred in the Agent Orange litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the
Claims Court are affirmed.
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED.
PLAGER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The story of the litigation stemming from our
Government's use of Agent Orange during the
Vietnam War is long and complex. It may be that it
is best to put this chapter of our nation's history
behind us, and to bury the issues with the dead.
Appellants, by bringing this suit, do not allow us that
peace. Be that as it may, as a court of law we are
obliged to give appellants whatever justice the law
affords. I believe the law affords substantially more
justice than the majority concedes.
Appellants present a host of arguments founded
in government contract law, each of which a majority
of this panel rejects. The many points of government
contract law raised in this case and so finely parsed,
however, should not be allowed to obscure the
fundamental question: if the Government compels
manufacture of a product by private companies, a
product known to the Government to be potentially
dangerous, and the use by the Government of the
product causes the manufacturers to incur liability,
may the Government claim immunity from the
consequences of its conduct? I think not.
1.
While there no doubt are civic-minded individuals
in the upper ranks of both companies, and perhaps
even among their lawyers, the notion that these
manufacturers voluntarily made a twenty million
dollar contribution to the veterans of the Vietnam War
and their families out of the goodness of their hearts
seems rather far fetched, and might even raise
questions about their fiduciary obligations to their
shareholders.
2.
The majority concludes that, despite what the trial
judge may have believed, the Government had no
liability to these contractors because of the
government contractor defense as explicated in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp. In the majority's view,
Boyle disposes of appellants' implied warranty of
specifications theory because the Supreme Court in
Boyle in effect immunizes contractors such as these
from all liability in situations such as that in the
original Agent Orange plaintiffs' suit. There are at
least two problems with this reasoning.
In the Agent Orange litigation, suit was brought
by the plaintiffs not as a state tort action under the
FTCA, but as a federal law action based on certain
federal statutes and on case law recognizing, even
after Erie, a limited scope for federal common law.
Jurisdiction was alleged, not in diversity, but under
"the common law and/or the statutory laws of the
United States of America," as a federal question case
under 28 U.S.C. §1331. The original trial judge held
that substantial federal interests were affected by the
litigation, and that federal common law provided both
the substantive measure of liability and the basis for
jurisdiction.
In light of this history, to suggest that the
evolving government contractor defense would clearly
dictate the outcome in the original Agent Orange
litigation seems to me to be unwarranted historical
revisionism, out of place in the decision before us in
this case. I do not know what the ultimate decision in
the Agent Orange litigation would have been on this
issue, nor does anyone. Since I find unpersuasive the
majority's defense of the trial judge's summary
judgment on this point, and since I believe there are a
number of unresolved fact and law issues, I would
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return the case to the Court of Federal Claims with
instructions to hold a full trial on the issues.
3.
The majority has also rejected appellants' theory
of government liability under the doctrine of superior
knowledge. If the Government's knowledge is
superior to that of the contractor, the Government may
incur liability if it fails to disclose information
required by the contractor. There are "instances in
which the defendant [the Government] is clearly under
such an affirmative obligation and cannot remain
silent.". The Government had more knowledge of the
potential harm caused by Agent Orange than did
appellants, who had not participated in the
development of, had little experience with, and were
relatively ignorant regarding the health hazards posed
by, Agent Orange. Thus appellants contend that the
Government is responsible for the harms caused to the
Agent Orange plaintiffs, and that consequently the
Government should pay appellants' share of the
settlement fund.
There is neither prior authority nor present reason
to limit the doctrine of superior knowledge to require
compensation only for difficulties incurred during
performance.
Finally, as noted earlier, the Government
compelled appellants to produce Agent Orange under
the authority granted by the Defense Production Act
(DPA), 50 U.S.C. app. ss 2061 et seq. (1964). The
DPA requires manufacturers to accept contracts
deemed necessary to the national defense, and further
requires manufacturers to give such contracts absolute
priority over other obligations.
I have three problems with the majority's reading
of the DPA. First, the majority's conclusion is a non
sequitur: that the Act grants manufacturers immunity
against third parties on contractual claims does not
suggest, much less require, that the Act grants the
Government immunity against manufacturers who
suffer other losses.
Second, although justice may be blind, judges
should take some cognizance of practical realities. A
statute that gives the Government the authority to
force private manufacturers to accept contracts and to
place such contracts before their other obligations
gives the Government substantial operational control
over those enterprises. Under the DPA, the
Government in effect can seize the company.
Congress recognized that reality, and specified a hold
harmless clause in the Act.
Third, the majority ignores the language of the
statute. The majority argues that "if Congress had
intended [the statute] to impose upon the government
the kind of liability asserted by Thompson, it would
have said so in clear and unequivocal terms." The
Agent Orange litigation was historic, and was both
substantively and procedurally unimaginable at the
time of the passage of the Defense Production Act.
We should not expect Congress to have specifically
described a liability problem arising from a judicial
process of which they could have had scant idea. Yet
if Congress intended to limit the sweeping scope of
the hold harmless provision to contract performance
only, Congress could have written, for example, "No
person shall be held liable for breach of contractual
obligations caused by any act or failure to act, etc."
That is not the language of the statute. It is difficult to
imagine more "clear and unequivocal" terms than that
actually used by Congress: "No person shall be held
liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to
act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance
with a rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this
Act . . ." The law as well as the circumstances
support the Government's liability.
4.
Over the past several years the parties to this
litigation and the courts have expended much effort
phrasing the issues presented by this case in terms of
government contract law. As the preceding discussion
suggests, however, the conceptual grammar of
government contract law may be inadequate to the
task. Because the relationship between appellants and
the Government was never arms-length, any
discussion of that relationship in doctrinal terms that
presume freedom of contract is incoherent.
The twenty million dollars or so at stake in this
litigation may be small potatoes to the Federal
Government, and we do not know how much the
money means to the financial health of appellants.
But if there ever is a case in which we can fairly say,
it is not the money, it is the principle that matters, this
is the case. At the core of this litigation is the way in
which our nation distributes the burden of its military
activity among its citizens. In wartime, that burden is
ineviLauly UsuiUuted unevenly. We cleave to the
Constitution, however, in spite of unfairness. The
Constitution provides an apt analogy--the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is "designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." The
question in this case is whether the public should pay
for the damages that the federal judiciary has
attributed to the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, or
whether appellants alone should bear the burden.
The Government took away appellants' control
over their businesses. By assuming control, the
Government deprived appellants of their ability to
conduct themselves prudently, and instead forced
appellants to engage in a dangerous enterprise, the
manufacture of Agent Orange. In exposing appellants
to risk, the Government incurred an obligation to
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make appellants whole should the danger come to
pass. The danger of the Government's use of Agent
Orange is now clear, or as clear as our law can make
it. Equally clear is the Government's obligation to
indemnify appellants. No amount of niggling at
doctrine can obscure that simple truth.
I respectfully dissent.
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HIGH COURT'S AGENT ORANGE CASE MAY SHAPE
FUTURE LIABILITY SUITS
Environment Week
Copyright 1995 King Communications Group, Inc.
Thursday, April 13, 1995
Paul Kemezis
In a move that could have a major impact on
future environmental liability suits and corporate
contracting for government work involving
environmentally hazardous products, the Supreme
Court has agreed to consider a case involving
compensation to American soldiers who were exposed
to the defoliant agent orange during the Vietnam War.
In the case (Hercules et. al. vs the United States),
two companies that manufactured agent orange under
government orders during the Vietnam War are
claiming that the government should reimburse them
for their share of a 1984 settlement in which veterans
received $180 million from several manufacturers of
the defoliant.
In the settlement, reached just before the case
went to trial, Hercules paid $18.7 million, and W.T.
Thompson Co. paid $3 million. Thompson
subsequently went bankrupt because of the litigation
and settlement costs.
The companies say they were forced to produce
the defoliant under strict government orders and
specifications and were not aware at the time that
highly toxic dioxin would be created as a side product.
They say the clear language of the Defense
Production Act shields contractors from liability for
damages caused by products made under government
orders and specifications if the companies are unaware
of the dangers involved and are not informed about
them by the government.
The federal government, however, in cases
decided by the Federal Claims Court and the U.S.
Appeals Court for the Federal Circuit, has successfully
argued that Hercules and Thompson would have
clearly won the original case against the veterans
based on the Defense Production Act language.
But since the companies voluntarily agreed to
make the settlement, the Justice Department says, the
federal government has no obligation to compensate
them for their losses.
In making their argument to the Supreme Court,
the companies said the lower court decisions were
wrong because they allowed the government to
"escape from accountability" for its actions to demand
production of agent orange, which it knew to be
hazardous.
Hercules and Thompson also argued that the
precedent, if upheld, would discourage other
government contractors from entering into settlements
in similar cases, undermining the judicial principle
that "reasonable settlements" should be encouraged by
the courts.
In this case, the companies noted, the veterans
were demanding damages of up to $40 billion,
although they settled for less than half that amount.
The companies believed they could not risk a negative
ruling on the Defense Production Act liability
protections with such large amounts at stake.
At the same time, the companies warned that by
letting the government off the hook in this case, the
courts would force private companies to raise the price
of government contracts to account for the added risks.
Many companies might also refuse to contract
altogether--which would reduce competition and
increase costs.
They said that both the explicit language of the
Defense Production Act and established principles of
contract law require that the government be held
responsible for the damages.
In its brief against the companies, the Justice
Department said that it has never been proven in any
court that there was a clear connection between agent
orange exposure and cancer or other illnesses or
health problems. This meant that the companies would
have easily won in a trial against the veterans and in
any case could make no claim against the government
for product liability.
It said that if the Hercules-Thompson claim was
upheld, government contractors would be encouraged
to settle "meritless" product liability suits in similar
situations and then seek to recover costs from the
government.
Also, Justice said that the liability protections
placed in the Defense Production Act by Congress
were narrow and were meant to protect companies
from suits in cases where They nad to break otner
contracts to give priority to government work.
The protection did not extend to product liability
claims brought by third parties under tort law, Justice
said, adding that--absent explicit language in the
legislation--it certainly did not apply in cases where
the damage claims were already settled out of court.
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SUITS SET TO ALLEGE TOXIC EXPOSURE
Army Civilians Blame Work for Diseases
Company Says Proof Lacking
The Dallas Morning News
Saturday, May 13, 1995
Associated Press
Corpus Christi - Civilian workers at Corpus Christi
Army Depot said Friday they are preparing lawsuits
asserting that on-the-job exposure caused chronic
diseases for them and their families.
Going after big companies rather than the
government, the workers say they were contaminated
by Agent Orange, chemical solvents, heavy metals and
asbestos.
"We've got to try to get some justice for some
people that deserve justice," plaintiffs' attorney Benton
Musselwhite told about 150 workers at a carefully
staged rally.
Mr. Musselwhite filed a lawsuit Thursday in state
district court seeking at least $500 million from the
seven manufacturers of Agent Orange. It asserts that
the herbicide caused cancer and other diseases among
civilian depot employees who worked on helicopters
and spare parts from Vietnam.
In a claim that Mr. Musselwhite conceded was
"more speculative," the lawsuit also contends that
workers passed the contamination to their relatives.
The seven chemical companies deny any harmful
health effects from the 11 million gallons of herbicide
dumped from U.S. military aircraft to defoliate
Vietnamese jungles.
"If you look at studies that have been done on
Vietnam Veterans, they just don't show anything,"
said Tom Bistline, an attorney for St. Louis-based
Monsanto Co., one of the defendants.
Mr. Bistline said the defense likely will argue that
a statute of limitations has expired and that there's no
scientific proof of ill health effects.
Mr. Musselwhite vowed to sue the manufacturers
of chemical solvents, such as benzene, within three
weeks. Depot workers say the solvents were used for
cleaning and other activities.
A lawsuit against the makers of heavy metals such
as cadmium will either be attached to the solvents
lawsuit or filed separately in state district court here,
Mr. Musselwhite said. Workers will claim they
inhaled metal particles while working on machinery
at the depot.
Mr. Musselwhite said an asbestos lawsuit will
follow, although with different attorneys and possibly
in another jurisdiction.
Rheta Snow, a public affairs officer at the Army
Depot, said no one in the legal department was
available for comment Friday. None of the lawsuits
will name the depot or government agencies as
defendants, Mr. Musselwhite said.
The city is no stranger to toxic torts. Hundreds of
residents who live near refineries have sued alleging
that soil and air contamination have caused their
health and property values to deteriorate.
In a class-action case now at trial, thousands of
residents of nearby Robstown say that a 14-ton solvent
leak from an Occidental Chemical Corp. plant
poisoned their community in 1992.
OxyChem lawyers say the lawsuit is more a result
of aggressive lawyers than real health problems.
South Texas juries have a reputation for imposing
high damages against big companies.
"I wouldn't say that we are overly concerned about
it," said Mr. Bistline, adding that a trial is not near. "I
have confidence in the jury system, and I believe that
people listen to facts wherever they are."
At Friday's rally, 12 widows who say their
husbands died from chemical exposure at the Army
Depot sat next to Mr. Musselwhite as he spoke to a
semicircle of workers holding bright-orange signs
with slogans like "Agent Orange Contamination."
The seven Agent Orange producers agreed to a
$180 million settlement for veterans in 1984, creating
a trust fund that grew to $250 million. Nearly 250,000
veterans filed claims, said Mr. Musselwhite, who
conceded that not all claims were legitimate.
Mr. Bistline said the companies settled to avoid
years of litigation.
"We of the defense felt that it was worth the
expense of settling that case just to try to put the case
behind us," he said. "We hope that this can be done
and that this will not cause another surge of emotional
litigation."
Mr. Musselwhite was among the veterans'
attorneys who negotiated the settlement. He later
opposed it because of the huge number of claims, but
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the deal.
The other defendants are Diamond Shamrock Co.
and Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. (later
absorbed by Occidental Chemical Corp. and Maxus
Energy Corp.); Dow Chemical Co.; Uniroyal Inc.;
Hercules Inc.; Thompson-Hayward Chemical Corp.
(also known as Thompson Chemicals Corp.); and T.H.
Agriculture and Nutrition Inc.
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94-1471 VARITY CORP. v. HOWE
ERISA-Action by individual plan participants
and beneficiaries-Employer's non-disclosure.
Ruling below (CA 8, 36 F.3d 746, 63 LW
2209, 18 EBC 2121):
Individual employee benefit plan beneficiaries
may maintain action under Section 502(a)(3) of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act to
obtain injunction to enforce terms of plan and
restitution of benefits lost as result of breach of
fiduciary duty; provision of plan that unambig-
uously confers on employer right to amend or
terminate plan does not bar plan beneficiaries'
action for breach of fiduciary duty that was based
on allegations that employer, in hopes of avoiding
obligations under plan, encouraged plan partici-
pants to transfer to new subsidiary that, as ex-
pected by employer, failed.
Questions presented: (1) Does ERISA Section
502(a)(3) permit individual ERISA plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries to sue on their own behalf
for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty under
ERISA? (2) When ERISA-governed welfare
benefits plan expressly reserves right to termi-
nate, amend, or modify plan, and when that
reservation of rights is disclosed to plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries, may liability nonetheless
be imposed under ERISA Section 404(a) for
breach of fiduciary duty when employer fails to
disclose its expectation that at some point in
future benefits will be terminated?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/6/95, by Floyd
Abrams, and Cahill Gordon & Reindel, both of
New York, N.Y., and Thomas J. Kavaler, How-
ard G. Sloane, Katherine B. Harrison, David G.
Januszewski, Jonathan Sherman, William J.
Koehn, Deborah M. Tharnish, and Davis, Hock-
enberg, Wine, Brown, Koehn & Shors, all of Des
Moines, Iowa.
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HIGH COURT TO DECIDE ON EASING WORKERS' SUITS OVER LOST
BENEFITS
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Tuesday, April 25, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Washington - The Supreme Court agreed to decide
whether to make it easier for workers to file lawsuits
claiming an employer used dishonest means to stop
providing employee benefits.
The justices said yesterday they would hear an
appeal by Varity Corp., which was sued after it
eliminated health and other benefits for workers. In
1986, the workers were encouraged to transfer to a
newly created farm-equipment subsidiary that
quickly failed.
Two lower federal courts determined that
Varity, a Buffalo, N.Y., manufacturer of agricultural
and industrial machinery, established the new unit,
Massey Combines Corp., in Des Moines, Iowa, to
serve as a repository of troubled operations that
made tractors and combines. The lower courts also
found that Varity hoped to end its benefits
obligations to current and retired employees who
worked in the troubled operations.
As part of the reorganization, which Varity
dubbed Project Sunshine, the parent company
persuaded workers to move to Massey Combines
from another unit, Massey-Ferguson Inc., by
stressing that the new subsidiary had bright
prospects and a solid financial foundation. For
benefits coverage, Varity also transferred some
retired workers to Massey Combines.
Massey Combines, however, wasn't solvent
when it was started and had little chance of
surviving. When it failed in 1988, the transferred
workers and retirees stopped receiving benefits. The
current and former employees sued Varity in a
federal court in Iowa. They charged that they had
been duped into transferring to Massey Combines
and then denied their benefits in violation of the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
known as Erisa.
The plaintiffs won a total of $46 million at trial,
but that award was reduced by the trial judge and
then cut further by the federal appeals court based in
St. Louis. Still, the appeals court ruled that the
plaintiffs should be paid a total of roughly $800,000
in back benefits and should be reinstated in the
Massey-Ferguson benefits plan. The Supreme Court
decision affects about 80 plaintiffs.
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Varity relied
heavily on the fact that other federal courts have
ruled that Erisa doesn't allow workers to file suit on
their own behalf, as they did in this case. The
company's lawyer, Floyd Abrams, explained in an
interview that employees may sue because they have
been denied a particular benefit promised under a
plan, or they may sue on behalf of the plan as a
whole, if, for example, a company fails to fund it.
But Mr. Abrams maintained that individuals
shouldn't be permitted to use Erisa as their weapon
in a suit accusing Varity of breaching a duty to
protect its workers' interest -- what lawyers call a
fiduciary duty.
Moreover, even if Varity had such a fiduciary
duty, the company still contends that it wasn't
obligated to be forthcoming about the dire financial
position of Massey Combines. (Varity Corp. vs.
Howe)
- Ellen Joan Pollock in New York contributed
to this article.
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PENDING CASES MAY CLARIFY MURKIER PATENT QUESTIONS
Austin American-Statesman
Copyright 1995
Thursday, January 5, 1995
Teresa Riordan
New York Times Service
Washington - Tucked away to one side of Lafayette
Park and known mainly only to disgruntled inventors
and their lawyers, it may be one of the most
inconspicuous and obscure federal courts in the
nation. But two imminent rulings from the court could
affect businesses throughout the United States.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
is expected to hand down decisions soon that could
offer the clearest guidance yet on two of the murkiest
questions in patent law.
One asks what an inventor must demonstrate to
prove that another invention is so essentially
"equivalent" to his or her patent that it infringes the
patent.
The second asks whether it should be up to a jury
to determine the meaning of any ambiguous or
apparently contradictory wording in a patent.
The answers could have a "profound impact in the
world of commerce," according to Donald Dunner, a
patent lawyer.
Other lawyers agree that the impending court
rulings could have broad implications for American
business. Uncertain patent boundaries each year
prompt companies around the nation to spend billions
of dollars in licensing fees to keep from unwittingly
trespassing across intellectual property lines.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit Court rulings could
either curb or accelerate the growing trend for patent
disputes to be decided in jury trials. The number of
such cases has increased eightfold since 1974, and the
three largest patent-infringement awards on record
were handed out by juries.
The impending decisions could alter the outcome
of the largest patent-infringement award ever, even
though the case is not before the Federal Circuit
Court: a $1.2 billion jury decision in August 1993 in
favor of Litton Industries against Honeywell Inc.
Honeywell's lawyers have argued that the jury
strayed beyond its legal expertise in determining that
the company's aircraft navigation system violated
Litton's patent. The lower-court judge in California
who is overseeing the Litton-Honeywell case has not
yet forced Honeywell to pay up, and people familiar
with the case assume the California judge is awaiting
the rulings in Washington.
"Cases like Honeywell demonstrate what is at
stake," said Donald Chisum, a law professor at the
University of Washington in Seattle. "It's literally a
billion-dollar question."
All this from a court that did not even exist until
1982 and has a hodgepodge jurisdiction that ranges
from customs cases to disputes over government
contracts. The main reason that the court was set up a
dozen years ago was to make the nation's patent law
coherent.
Because the Supreme Court rarely reviews patent
cases, the Federal Circuit has become in essence the
highest patent court in the land.
"Our cases tend to have a very strong element of
institutional, structural impact," said Judge S. Jay
Plager, a former Indiana University law school dean
who has been a member of the 12-judge court since
1989. "It's not simply a question of how a decision
will impact on a few inventors," Plager said, "but how
it will impact on research and development - how it
will impact on investment."
The mundane details of the cases behind the two
imminent rulings belie their larger significance.
In one of them, Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
contended that a competitor, Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
had infringed its patented process for making purified
food dyes -not by literally copying the process, but by
adopting the essence of the invention. Although there
have been hundreds of cases over the years argued on
similar grounds, legal experts predict that the Federal
Circuit Court may use this one to try to clarify a
long-obscure legal notion known in patent circles as
the Doctrine of Equivalence.
The doctrine evolved out of series of Supreme
Court rulings, tracing to the mid-19th century, that
have attempted to protect inventors from pirates who
make only minor modifications in order to circumvent
the patent protection. The Doctrine of Equivalence is
supposed to be the basis for determining whether
virtual infringement has occurred even if literal
copying has not.
But making this judgment involves an elusive
three-part comparison test of "way," "function" and
"results" - a standard that many lawyers agree is
hopelessly vague. As far back as 1929, the revered
jurist Learned Hand, then a federal judge, criticized
the doctrine as "no more than a way of stating the
problem."
The result, by the 1990s, has been increasing
ambiguity about where patent protection ends and
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where infringement begins. "You want to know, 'If I
put a shrub down, is it on my land or on my
neighbor's?' " said Stanley Amberg, a New York
patent attorney. "You don't want to hear, 'Well, maybe
it's on mine, maybe it's on his.' "
If the Federal Circuit Court does move to clarify
the doctrine's interpretation, many experts agree that
the repercussions could carry beyond courtrooms and
into boardrooms. The decision, they say, would very
likely affect the thousands of licensing agreements - in
which technology is swapped or royalties are paid -
that are struck each year between companies as an
ordinary course of business.
"All licensing agreements are negotiated in the
shadow of current law, and the Doctrine of
Equivalence has cast a pretty big shadow," said
Robert Merges, a law professor at Boston University.
"The broader the interpretation of the Doctrine of
Equivalence," Merges said, "the more likely you are to
say, 'Aw, the heck with it, I'm just going to sign a
licensing agreement.'
"Lawyers in negotiations track this closely," he
continued. "They use it for ammunition. It changes the
strategic situation any time a big Doctrine of
Equivalence case comes down."
Janet Hasak, a patent attorney with the
biotechnology company Genentech, agreed with that
assessment. But she noted that the court, instead of
broadening the definition of "equivalence," could
decide to make it much narrower. And that could hurt
inventors, she said.
"A ruling that limits the scope of the doctrine will
have an impact on licensing," Hasak said, "especially
for small biotechnology companies looking for
financing."
The Hilton-Davis case also touches on the role of
juries in patent cases, by raising the question of
whether it should be the judge or the jury that
determines the definition of "equivalence." But it is
the other pending ruling in the Federal Circuit, in
which the role of ajury is likely to be the more central
issue.
This second ruling actually involves two separate
cases in which the appeals court has found a similar
question. In one case, Pall Corp. successfully accused
Micron Separation of infringing its patent for nylon
filtering material.
In the second, Herbert Markman successfully sued
Westview Instruments Inc. for reportedly infringing a
patented bar-code inventory system. In both cases, the
technical wording of the patents - and what the Patent
Office meant when it wrote them - lay at the core of
the disputes.
In taking these two cases on appeal and
considering them together, the Federal Circuit is
examining whether a jury should rule on such lawyerly
distinctions - or whether, perhaps, the judge should
instead interpret what the patent's language means and
let the jury decide whether the patent has been
violated.
Many patent lawyers predict that if it were judges,
and not juries, doing more of the legal interpretation
in patent cases, patentholders would win fewer cases.
An inventor's lawyer "can tell a jury that grape
juice is the equivalent of a light bulb and get away
with it," said Dunner, whose winning cases before the
Federal Circuit Court include his 1992 appeal on
behalf of Mattel Corp.
In that case, the federal court overturned an $80
million verdict against Mattel that a jury in a lower
court had awarded to Jerome Lemelson, an
independent inventor who claimed that the plastic
tracks for Mattel's Hot Wheels toy cars had infringed
one of Lemelson's many patents.
"The patent claims," Dunner said, "were stretched
beyond recognition in that case."
But Gerald Hosier, the lawyer who represents
Lemelson, hotly disputed that he and his client had
somehow persuaded the jury to stretch the patent's
boundaries. He said that juries are generally qualified
to interpret the legal details in patent cases, and that
lawyers who argue otherwise are elitist.
"There's a collective wisdom in juries," Hosier
said. "People like to do the right thing."
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94-1660 AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. v.
LOCKWOOD
Validity-Jury trial.
Ruling below (CA FC, 33 USPQ2d 1406):
Patentee whose claim for infringement has
been dismissed enjoys Seventh Amendment right
to jury trial of accused infringer's counterclaim
for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.
Question presented: In action in which sole
claim to be tried is claim under Declaratory
Judgment Act to have patent declared invalid, is
there right to jury trial under Seventh
Amendment?
Petition for certiorari filcd 4/10/95, by Don
W. Martens, Joseph R. Re, Paul A. Stewart, and
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, all of Newport
Beach, Calif., Bruce J. Ennis Jr., Paul M. Smith,
and Jenner & Block, all of Washington, D.C.,
and R. Bruce Wark.
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In re Lockwood
U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit
33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1406
Misc. Docket No. 394
Decided January 11, 1995
ORDER
American Airlines, Inc. (American) petitions for
rehearing of our nonprecedential March 11, 1994
order granting Lawrence B. Lockwood's petition for a
writ of mandamus, wherein we directed the district
court to reinstate Lockwood's jury demand in
American's pending action for a declaration that
Lockwood's two patents are invalid. Lockwood
opposes rehearing.
American also moves for leave to file a reply,
with the reply attached, and for a precedential order.
II. DISCUSSION
Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is
of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our
history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment
of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care.
American maintains its declaratory judgment
action against Lockwood in order to test the validity
of Lockwood's patents. Insofar as the validity of the
patents is adjudicated, American's action resembles
nothing so much as a suit for patent infringement in
which the affirmative defense of invalidity has been
pled, and Lockwood's right to a jury trial must be
determined accordingly. The primary difference
between American's action and the infringement suit
that would formerly have been required for an
adjudication of validity is that the parties' positions
here have been inverted, and such an inversion cannot
operate to frustrate Lockwood's Seventh Amendment
rights.
As we have demonstrated, the Seventh
Amendment preserves to Lockwood the same right to
ajury trial on the factual questions relating to validity
in a declaratory judgment action that he would have
enjoyed had the validity of his patents been
adjudicated in a suit for patent infringement according
to eighteenth-century English practice.
In eighteenth-century England, allegations of
patent infringement could be raised in both actions at
law and suits in equity. Because an action at law for
damages could not obviate the need for perpetual
litigation over future acts of infringement nor ascertain
the full extent of the injury done to one's interests by
past acts of infringement, courts of equity gave a
patentee the option of pursuing injunctions and
accountings against alleged infringers. The choice of
forum and remedy, and thus of the method of trial, was
left with the patentee. Nineteenth-century American
practice followed the same basic pattern. If the
patentee sought only damages, the patentee brought an
action at law; in such a case, the defense of invalidity
was tried to the jury, assuming that a jury had been
demanded. However, if the patentee facing past acts of
infringement nevertheless sought only to enjoin future
acts of infringement, the patentee could only bring a
suit in equity, and the defense of invalidity ordinarily
would be tried to the bench. Under both English and
American practice, then, it was the patentee who
decided in the first instance whether a jury trial on the
factual questions relating to validity would be
compelled.
We cannot, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, deny Lockwood that same choice merely
because the validity of his patents comes before the
court in a declaratory judgment action for invalidity
rather than as a defense in an infringement suit.
Lock-wood is entitled to have the factual questions
relating to validity in this case tried to a jury as a
matter of right.
C. American's Counterarguments
American maintains that its action for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity is entirely equitable
in nature, and thus provides Lockwood no grounds to
assert that he has been wrongfully deprived of a jury
trial. American does not, however, cite a single
eighteenth-century English suit in equity where, with
the alleged infringer as plaintiff the court adjudicated
the validity of a patent. Instead, American cites a
number of cases for the proposition that " [tihe courts
are unanimous ... in holding that there is no right to
trial by jury in an action seeking only a declaration of
patent invalidity and unenforceability." In addition,
American broadly asserts that "an action for
declaratory relief is ordinarily equitable in nature,"
and that Lockwood's Seventh Amendment claim may
be disposed of accordingly. We consider each of these
arguments in turn, concluding that both are deeply
flawed.
In sum, the cases American cites either focus on
the presence of a request for injunctive relief and the
absence of a request for monetary damages or involve
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issues other than the litigants' Seventh Amendment
rights. What none of the cases discuss is a common
law cause of action whereby an alleged infringer could
call the patentee into court for an adjudication of a
patent's validity. And only evidence of such a common
law cause of action would support the position
American takes in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that a suit for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity is more comparable to a lawsuit
for patent infringement than to any historical equitable
action. Prior to the Declaratory Judgments Act, an
alleged infringer had no action in equity specifically to
challenge the validity of a patent and obtain an
adjudication thereon. Because a lawsuit for patent
infringement could be maintained in a court of law,
patent validity was an issue that, if raised, could be
decided in a court of law, in contradistinction to an
issue that could be decided only in a court of equity,
such as fraud in obtaining the patent. Because patent
validity is not purely an equitable issue, and because
the pending declaratory judgment action is most
comparable to an inversion of a patent infringement
lawsuit, Lockwood is entitled under the Seventh
Amendment to trial by jury in this declaratory
judgment action which is being pursued by American
to determine validity of his patents.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The court's March 11, 1994 order granting
Lockwood's mandamus petition is vacated.
(2) American's petition for rehearing is granted.
(3) American's motion for leave to file a reply is
granted.
(4) Lockwood's petition for writ of mandamus is
granted. The district court is directed to reinstate
Lockwood's jury demand.
(5) American's letter request for a precedential
order deciding the petition for writ of mandamus is
granted.
(6) American's alternative request for reissue of
the March 11, 1994 order in precedential form is
dismissed as moot.
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SUPREME COURT WILL DETERMINE RIGHT OF LITIGANTS
TO A JURY IN PATENT CASES
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Tuesday, June 6, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Washington -- The Supreme Court
agreed to decide whether combatants
in a patent lawsuit have a
constitutional right to have a jury hear
their case.
The justices yesterday said they'll
use a patent dispute involving
American Airlines' computerized
reservation system to resolve this
procedural question. American,
seeking to protect itself from an
intellectual-property suit over the
reservation system, had challenged the
validity of two patents relating to
automatic ticket-dispensing machines
and other equipment.
A federal appeals court in
Washington ruled that American's
opponent, Robert Lockwood, an
inventor from La Jolla, Calif., had a
right under the Seventh Amendment to
have a jury hear the case. American, a
unit of AMR Corp., appealed to the
Supreme Court, stressing that the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit conflicted with
rulings of other courts.
A trade group representing
intellectual-property lawyers filed a
brief with the high court supporting
American's appeal on the jury iu ip
although the organization said it didn't
have an interest in the final outcome of
the case. The lawyers association
warned that if the Federal Circuit
decision were allowed to stand and
were followed by other federal appeals
courts, far more trials now resolved by
judges would be turned over to juries.
This development could create
new burdens for the federal judiciary
because of the extra time and expense
associated with jury trials. The lawyers
group pointed out that, if extended
broadly, the lower-court's approach
could affect not just patent cases, but
also other intellectual-property
disputes and perhaps a broad array of
other suits seeking judicial orders, as
opposed to money damages.
Mr. Lockwood initially sued
American in federal court in San
Diego in 1991, accusing the carrier of
infringing on two of his patents for
airline-ticketing equipment. American
prevailed on that claim. The carrier,
fearing further patent litigation on the
issue, filed a counterclaim, seeking to
invalidate the Lockwood patents.
The trial judge ruled against Mr.
Lockwood's request for a jury trial on
American's counter-claim. But the
Federal Circuit, which has appellate
jurisdiction over all
intellectual-property suits, said the
trial should go before ajury.
The Seventh Amendment
guarantees a jury trial in civil suits
seeking money damages. Mr.
T-Lcwood1's original suit against
American had sought money damages,
and therefore the jury right should
cover his defense of the carrier's
counterclaim stemming from that suit,
the appeals court reasoned.
(American Airlines Inc. vs.
Lockwood).
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JURY CASES ON PATENT INFRINGEMENT ON TRIAL
Copyright Bloomberg Business News
reprinted in Chicago Tribune, Monday, June 12, 1995
After three years of trial preparation, almost a
month of courtroom battle and six hours of jury
deliberation, the patent trial between inventor
Raymond Damadian and General Electric Co.
appeared to have come to a climax.
"We have reached a decision," the bailiff said,
reading the message from the jury to a hushed
audience of lawyers who had rushed in to brace for the
verdict. "We need more Diet Coke."
GE's attorneys didn't smile at the attempted
humor. Nor were they amused two hours later when
the jury delivered a real punchline: A $110.5 million
verdict against GE for infringing on two patents
covering magnetic resonance imaging technology.
GE's not alone in being touchy on this issue. The
Fairfield, Conn.-based manufacturer is only the latest
company to get walloped by a big jury verdict in a
patent suit. And like most corporate defendants, GE
took its wrath out on the jurors, saying the panel
"apparently acted on emotion, not facts or law" by
favoring an underdog inventor over a deep-pocketed
corporation.
Corporate defendants and patent lawyers have
long griped that intellectual property litigation is too
complex to leave to plumbers, housewives, mailmen
and music teachers.
But these days, the role of the jury in patent cases
is being scrutinized like never before. The
reexamination comes as patent law is expanding
dramatically. The number of patent cases filed has
grown by 41 percent since 1990, and the number tried
before juries has increased eightfold in the last 20
years.
The size of verdicts also has risen sharply. The
three largest patent infringement awards were all made
by juries in the 1990s: Litton Industries won a $1.2
billion award against Honeywell Inc., a verdict that
was later overturned by a judge; Polaroid Corp. was
awarded $873 million against Eastman Kodak Co.;
and Alpex Computer Corp. won a $208 million
verdict against Nintendo Corp.
Courts are reviewing several key cases that could
significantly curb the use of juries in deciding such
disputes.
"As far as patents go, these cases are the
showdown at OK Corral," said Donald S. Chisum, a
patent expert and law professor at University of
Washington in Seattle.
The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, agreed last
Monday to decide a case that could determine whether
litigants have a constitutional right to have a jury
decide if a disputed patent is valid-a crucial first stage
of patent cases. When a patent is deemed valid, a trial
usually moves to the question of whether infringement
occurred.
The dispute began when American Airlines
sought to have an inventor's claim to automatic ticket
dispensing systems declared invalid. The inventor
wanted a jury trial, but a lower court turned him down.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Washington said the inventor could have his jury trial,
but three judges wrote a lengthy dissent saying juries
shouldn't be allowed to hear patent validity cases.
American Airlines, encouraged by the dissent,
appealed to the Supreme Court.
"Until now, no one had given much thought to
whether a jury is needed or whether a litigant is even
entitled to one," said Joseph Re, an attorney with
Knobbe, Martens, Olson, and Bear who represents
American Airlines.
The high court's move follows a landmark
decision by the same appeals court in April. That case
involved a lawsuit by Herbert Markman, inventor of
a bar-code inventory system for dry cleaners, against
Westview Instruments Inc. The court ruled that
judges, rather than juries, should handle the key initial
phase of patent trials-defining the scope of a patent.
That ruling will be appealed to the Supreme
Court soon, according to lawyers involved.
The appeals court, which handles all patent
appeals, also has under review a case involving Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. that raises the question of
whether juries should decide the frequent cases in
which the alleged infringer is accused not of having
literally copied a patented process but rather of
adopting the essence of the invention.
The threat of blockbuster verdicts is a big reason
many companies settle patent cases before trial, some
attorneys say. Some legal experts have called for the
appointment of specially trained judges to hear
complex patent cases as a way to ensure more
predictability and evenhandedness.
"Right now it's a lottery," said Martin J.
Adelman, a patent law specialist and law professor at
Wayne State University in Detroit. "No other country
in the world has even considered handing patent cases
over to juries."
New York attorney Albert Fey thinks he knows
why. He once tried to convince a jury that AT&T
Corp. hadn't infringed on a patent for the
"modularization of the time and switch elements" of a
digital telephone system. After a one-week trial, thejury came back with a $35 million verdict against
AT&T. The verdict was reversed on appeal.
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"This stuff is even complicated for someone with
a Ph.D. in engineering," Fey said. "A jury's eyes glaze
over."
Washington patent lawyer Donald Dunner said
another drawback of using juries in complex cases is
they are largely unaccountable. While judges back up
their decisions with detailed, written opinions, the
verdicts delivered by juries are yes-no answers that are
difficult to appeal.
Plaintiffs' lawyers say the Constitution guarantees
the right to ajury trial. Patent cases, they argue, are no
more arcane than many other types of lawsuits,
including antitrust and product liability disputes.
"It's arrogant and elitist to argue that jury
members discussing and arguing things through can't
handle complicated matters," said Michael Ciresi, a
partner at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, the
Minneapolis firm that represented inventor Damadian
and his company, Fonar Corp., in the trial against GE.
Ciresi better hope the judge agrees. Even without
jury reforms, judges possess broad powers to overturn
verdicts. Fonar learned that the hard way 10 years ago
when it won ajury verdict against Johnson & Johnson
on one of its MRI patents. A judge wiped out the
verdict six weeks later, saying it didn't square with the
evidence.
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94-1527 BARR LABORATORIES INC. v. BUR-
ROUCrHS--WELLCONE-CO.
Infringement-Use of AZT to treat AIDS.
Ruling below (CA FC, 40 F.3d 1223, 32
USPQ2d 1915):
Inventor need not know that his invention will
work for conception to be complete, but need only
show that he had patentable idea; discovery that
invention actually works is part of its reduction to
practice; evidence demonstrates that named in-
ventors, employed by drug company, had, prior to
experiment conducted by National Institutes of
Health, conceived idea of using compound of
known structure-AZT-to treat AIDS, and
that idea was in sufficiently final form that only
exercise of ordinary skill remained to reduce it to
practice; accordingly, regardless of whether
named inventors reasonably believed that inven-
tion would work for its intended purpose, NIH
scientists who confirmed that AZT was active
against virus believed to cause AIDS are not co-
inventors and were thus properly omitted from
list of inventors on patents covering various prep-
arations of AZT and methods to use it to treat
AIDS; five of plaintiffs six AZT-related patents
are therefere valid and infringed by drug compa-
nies that manufacture and market generic version
of AZT, but evidence is insufficient for determi-
nation to be made for sixth patent, which seeks
protection for use of AZT to increase patient's T-
cell count.
Question presented: Can one be inventor of
patentable pharmaceutical method of treatment
(here, use of AZT to treat AIDS), for purposes of
35 USC 101, when one has no reason to believe
that such method will work?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/15/95, by Dan K.
Webb, Eric L. Hirschhorn, George C. Lombardi,
James F. Hurst, Monique M. Vasilchik, and
Winston & Strawn, all of Chicago, Ill.
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BURROUGHS WELLCOME CO., Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
BARR LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant,
and
Novopharm, Inc. and Novopharm, Ltd., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-1503 to 93-1505.




Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1994.
MAYER, Circuit Judge.
Barr Laboratories, Inc., Novopharm, Inc., and
Novopharm, Ltd., appeal the order of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, granting the motion of Burroughs Wellcome
Co. for judgment as a matter of law that six United
States patents were not invalid and were infringed.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Discussion
The arguments of both Barr and Novopharm are
directed to when the inventors conceived the
invention. Burroughs Wellcome says it was before
they learned the results of the NIH tests; Barr and
Novopharm say that confirmation of the inventions'
operability, which came from the NIH tests, was an
essential part of the inventive process. If Burroughs
Wellcome is right, then the patents name the proper
inventors, they are not invalid, and the appellants are
liable for infringement. If Barr and Novopharm are
correct, then Broder, Mitsuya, and Yarchoan should
have been named as joint inventors and the resolution
of Burroughs Wellcome's infringement suits is
premature.
Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the
completion of the mental part of invention. It is "the
formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative
invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."
Conception is complete only when the idea is so
clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the
invention to practice, without extensive research or
experimentation. Because it is a mental act, courts
require corroborating evidence of a contemporaneous
disclosure that would enable one skilled in the art to
make the invention.
Thus, the test for conception is whether the
inventor had an idea that was definite and permanent
enough that one skilled in the art could understand the
invention; the inventor must prove his conception by
corroborating evidence, preferably by showing a
contemporaneous disclosure. An idea is definite and
permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled
idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand, not
just a general goal or research plan he hopes to
pursue. The conception analysis necessarily turns on
the inventor's ability to describe his invention with
particularity. Until he can do so, he cannot prove
possession of the complete mental picture of the
invention. These rules ensure that patent rights attach
only when an idea is so far developed that the inventor
can point to a definite, particular invention.
But an inventor need not know that his invention
will work for conception to be complete. He need
only show that he had the idea; the discovery that an
invention actually works is part of its reduction to
practice.
Barr and Novopharm suggest that the inventor's
definite and permanent idea must include a reasonable
expectation that the invention will work for its
intended purpose. They argue that this expectation is
of paramount importance when the invention deals
with uncertain or experimental disciplines, where the
inventor cannot reasonably believe an idea will be
operable until some result supports that conclusion.
Without some experimental confirmation, they
suggest, the inventor has only a hope or an
expectation, and has not yet conceived the invention in
sufficiently definite and permanent form. But this is
not the law. An inventor's belief that his invention
will work or his reasons for choosing a particular
approach are irrelevant to conception.
It is undoubtedly true that "[in some instances,
an inventor is unable to establish a conception until he
has reduced the invention to practice through a
successful experiment." But in such cases, it is not
merely because the field is unpredictable; the alleged
conception fails because it is incomplete. Then the
event of reduction to practice in effect provides the
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only evidence to corroborate conception of the
invention.
Under these circumstances, the reduction to
practice can be the most definitive corroboration of
conception, for where the idea is in constant flux, it is
not definite and permanent. A conception is not
complete if the subsequent course of experimentation,
especially experimental failures, reveals uncertainty
that so undermines the specificity of the inventor's
idea that it is not yet a definite and permanent
reflection of the complete invention as it will be used
in practice. It is this factual uncertainty, not the
general uncertainty surrounding experimental sciences,
that bears on the problem of conception.
The Burroughs Wellcome inventors set out with
the general goal of finding a method to treat AIDS,
but by the time Broder confirmed that AZT was active
against HIV, they had more than a general hope or
expectation. They had thought of the particular
antiviral agent with which they intended to address the
problem, and had formulated the idea of the inventions
to the point that they could express it clearly in the
form of a draft patent application, which Barr and
Novopharm concede would teach one skilled in the art
to practice the inventions. The draft expressly
discloses the intended use of AZT to treat AIDS. It
sets out the compound's structure, which, along with
at least one method of preparation, was already well
known. The draft also discloses in detail both how to
prepare a pharmaceutical formulation of AZT and how
to use it to treat a patient infected with HIV. The
listed dosages, dose forms, and routes of
administration conform to those eventually approved
by the FDA. The draft shows that the idea was clearly
defined in the inventors' minds; all that remained was
to reduce it to practice--to confirm its operability and
bring it to market.
An examination of the events that followed the
preparation of Burroughs Wellcome's draft confirms
the soundness of the conception. Broder and Mitsuya
received from Burroughs Wellcome a group of
compounds, known to Broder and Mitsuya only by
code names, selected for testing by the Burroughs
Wellcome inventors. They then tested those
compounds for activity against HIV in their patented
cell line. The test results revealed for the first time
that one of the compounds, later revealed to be AZT,
was exceptionally active against the virus.
Here, though, the testing was brief, simply
confirming the operability of what the draft
application disclosed. True, the science surrounding
HIV and AIDS was unpredictable and highly
experimental at the time the Burroughs Wellcome
scientists made the inventions. But what matters for
conception is whether the inventors had a definite and
permanent idea of the operative inventions. In this
case, no prolonged period of extensive research,
experiment, and modification followed the alleged
conception. By all accounts, what followed was
simply the normal course of clinical trials that mark
the path of any drug to the marketplace.
That is not to say, however, that the NIH
scientists merely acted as a "pair of hands" for the
Burroughs Wellcome inventors. Broder and Mitsuya
exercised considerable skill in conducting the tests,
using their patented cell line to model the responses of
human cells infected with HIV. Lehrman did suggest
initial concentrations to Broder, but she hardly
controlled the conduct of the testing, which necessarily
involved interpretation of results for which Broder and
Mitsuya, and very few others, were uniquely qualified.
But because the testing confirmed the operability of
the inventions, it showed that the Burroughs
Wellcome inventors had a definite and permanent idea
of the inventions. It was part of the reduction to
practice and inured to the benefit of Burroughs
Wellcome.
The question is not whether Burroughs Wellcome
reasonably believed that the inventions would work
for their intended purpose, the focus of the evidence
offered by Barr and Novopharm, but whether the
inventors had formed the idea of their use for that
purpose in sufficiently final form that only the exercise
of ordinary skill remained to reduce it to practice.
Whether or not Burroughs Wellcome believed the
inventions would in fact work based on the mouse
screens is irrelevant.
We do not know precisely when the inventors
conceived their inventions, but the record shows that
they had done so by the time they prepared the draft
patent application that thoroughly and particularly set
out the inventions as they would later be used. The
district court correctly ruled that on this record, the
NIH scientists were not joint inventors of these
inventions.
The '750 patent is another question. It claims "[a]
method of increasing the number of T-lymphocytes in
- t... 1* J . . rT~rIa huflan inIected with tUe [IV] vi r uhiprising
administering to said human an effective amount of'
AZT. Novopharm argues that there is no evidence,
under any test of inventorship, that the Burroughs
Wellcome inventors conceived of this invention until
after the Phase I patient study conducted by Broder
and Yarchoan revealed that AZT could lead to
increased levels of T-cells in AIDS patients.
The alleged conception is supported by testimony
of Burroughs Wellcome's experts, Burroughs
Wellcome's draft Phase I protocol, and the same draft
patent application that corroborates conception of the
other five inventions. The experts testified that those
skilled in the art at the time expected increased
immune function to accompany inhibition of HIV.
The draft patent application discloses that HIV
preferentially destroys T-cells, that AIDS is associated
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with progressive depletion of T-cells, and that AZT is
an effective treatment for HIV infection. Finally, the
draft protocol directs the administrators of the Phase
I study to monitor patients' T-lymphocyte count. This
evidence supports an inference that the Burroughs
Weilcome inventors did have the necessary definite
and permanent idea, for, given the virus' effect on T-
lymphocytes, it seems logical to conclude that
stopping the virus might reverse the process of T-cell
destruction and restore the body's immune system to
a pre-infection state. If this were the only evidence in
the record, the court's judgment would be sustained.
But Novopharm offered evidence suggesting that
one skilled in the art would not have expected T-cell
count to rise. On deposition, Broder testified that
prior to the first patient study, "no one knew whether
there was such a thing as recovery" of T-cells, based
on the NIH's experience with suramin, a drug that
entered clinical trials before AZT. Although suramin
showed some activity against HIV, inhibition of the
retrovirus apparently was not accompanied by
increases in T-cell count or restoration of immune
functions. Of course, there might be any number of
other explanations for the results of the suramin trials;
but they might suggest that although those skilled in
the art recognized the significance of T-lymphocyte
levels in HIV infection and AIDS, they might have
expected inhibition of the virus simply to halt the
continuing destruction of T-cells, not to increase
T-cell count and restore immune function. This could
support an inference that the inventors themselves did
not conceive the invention prior to the Phase I study.
Novopharm also contends that Burroughs
Wellcome prepared its Phase I protocol in
collaboration with Broder and the NIH, possibly from
a draft protocol prepared by Broder and Yarchoan
pursuant to their study of suramin. These contentions
are relevant to the conception inquiry for they tend to
undermine the corroborative value of the draft
protocol, and might even support joint inventorship
based on that draft. Because under Rule 50(a) all
inferences must be taken against the moving party, the
court's ruling on the '750 patent was inappropriate,
and we vacate the judgment to that extent and remand
for further proceedings.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.
COSTS
All parties will bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
LOURIE, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part.
I concur in the majority's decision with respect to
the '232, '838, '130, '208, and '538 patents, and join
the opinion except for the following:
I do not agree that reduction to practice is
corroboration of conception and that the completeness
of a conception is affected by subsequent experimental
success or failure. These statements confuse the idea
of conception with both corroboration and reduction
to practice. A conception must be judged as to its
completeness in relation to the invention being
claimed. It must also be corroborated by evidence
independent of the inventor. If subsequent
experimentation shows that an invention that was only
conceived does not work, that fact does not vitiate the
earlier conception. A conception not later reduced to
practice may have little significance, but it is
important that we not confuse concepts. The
conception was still a conception. It is of course
possible for an invention to be reduced to practice
constructively, i.e., by filing a patent application,
rather than actually, by doing the work, in which case
the reduction to practice clearly says nothing about the
completeness of the conception. Moreover, what
matters, in addition to the completeness of a
conception, is its date. Corroboration must be of the
date of the conception. If the only "corroboration" of
the conception is its reduction to practice,
corroboration has not occurred concerning the alleged
date of conception. Finally on this point, reduction to
practice by the inventor is not corroboration because
corroboration must be independent of the inventor.
Corroboration is not a demonstration that the
conceived invention works; it is evidentiary proof that
the mental act of invention occurred on a certain date.
Even assuming that the '750 method is a separate
invention, the majority concedes that evidence
supports an inference that the Burroughs Wellcome
inventors alone conceived the method. The majority
goes off the track, however, in relying on
Novopharm's offer of evidence that one would not
Have expected Ue T-cell count tL rise. Thisis
irrelevant if Burroughs Wellcome's inventors had the
conception, because the opinion earlier correctly holds
that a reasonable expectation of success is not
necessary to a conception.
The majority here is inviting the trial court on
remand and motion to partially split the inventorship,
and presumably also the ownership, of this related
collection of patents claiming the physical act of
"treating" and the result which the treatment
accomplishes. This makes no sense. It amounts to
deciding that treating a person in pain with aspirin is
one invention and invoking the pain-relieving
mechanism by means of that treatment is another.
One cannot apparently treat HIV-infected humans
with AZT without also increasing the level of
T-lymphocytes. The panel is thus inconsistent in
upholding the conclusion of the trial court that
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Burroughs Wellcome's scientists alone conceived the
invention of using AZT to treat HIV infection, but
then failing to arrive at the same conclusion regarding
a patent claiming one of the sequelae of that use.
The real result of the majority's vacating the
court's decision on the '750 patent is that, while it may
believe that it is affirming the decision on the other
patents, it may in practical effect be destroying
Burroughs Wellcome's exclusivity for its invention
and creating a whole new set of questions. If the trial
court joins the NIH inventors, and NIH has licensed
the patent to companies intending to sell AZT, will
those companies infringe the '232 and other patents?
Is the terminal disclaimer still valid, lacking the
consent of one of the assignees? Without a valid
terminal disclaimer, is the '750 patent valid? While
these questions are not before us, exploring them
illustrates the strange consequences of the majority's
decision. On the other hand, if the trial court confirms
its finding that the T-lymphocyte "invention" was
essentially the same invention and inured to the
benefit of Burroughs Wellcome, the remand will have
been superfluous. Useless and inefficient litigation
and burdening of the courts will have resulted.
The trial court's decision should be affirmed
across the board because it correctly found that the
Burroughs Wellcome inventors solely conceived and
are entitled to the inventive benefit of all the claimed
inventions.
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SUPREME COURT MAY HEAR AZT PATENT CASE
Inventorship and Pricing Issues May Arise
Antiviral Agents Bulletin
Copyright 1995 Biotechnology Information Institute
Thursday, June 1, 1995
The U.S. Supreme Court has requested that the
Justice Department render an official opinion
concerning the challenge of the U.S. patents covering
AZT by several generic drug companies. Although
the details of this request have not been disclosed, the
Supreme Court is essentially asking the government
for its position on this case. Besides involving
inventorship definitions and criteria, this request may
raise some politically sensitive issues touching upon
the government's interest in promoting generic drugs
to foster competition and establishing drug price
controls. The National Institutes of Health has taken
the stand that several of its staff deserve inventorship
and has already granted several generic drug
companies nonexclusive licenses, contingent upon
NIH winning patent rights. However, among the
major rationales for the AZT patent challenge have
been the perceived high cost of AZT, including that
paid by the government (the largest single purchaser
of AZT), and larger political issues involving generic
drugs and price controls where the government has
made a substantial contribution to a drug's
development. If NIH is granted sufficient
inventorship and assignment rights, AZT will quickly
become a generic drug marketed by multiple
companies. However, the government's response to
the Supreme Court's request will likely require
months, and the Court will probably not decide
whether it will formally hear this case until late 1995
or early 1996.
The challenge to the AZT patents originally
started in 1991. As reported in the December 1994
Bulletin (p. 364), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has affirmed Burroughs Wellcome Co.
(RearhT.,1AnI ark", INC n laxo Wellome)
as the sole inventor and assignee for the main U.S.
patents covering use of AZT (Retrovir) for treatment
of HIV-infection and AIDS. Wellcome's rights were
upheld for five patents (4,724,232; 4,828,838;
4,833,130; 4,837,208; and 4,818,538) essentially
covering AZT for treatment of HIV, ARC and AIDS
and solid and liquid drug formulations. One patent
(4,818,750; the '750 patent) concerning AZT use to
increase CD4+ T-cell counts was not upheld and will
be going to jury trial. As discussed in the October
1994 Bulletin (p. 300), August 1993 Bulletin (p. 235)
and other articles, several generic drug companies,
Barr Laboratories (Pomona, NY) and Novopharm,
Inc. (Schaumberg, 1L), have challenged the validity
and the granting of sole assignment of AZT patents to
Burroughs WeIlcome. They argue that scientists at
the National Cancer Inst. (NCI, NIH; Bethesda, MD)
made key contributions to the discovery and
demonstration of the utility of AZT for treatment of
HIV/AIDS and that Burroughs WeIlcome's patents are
invalid because they failed to properly attribute NCI
researchers as co-inventors. The appeals court upheld
the principle of granting patents to those who
originally conceived (thought through) the invention
even though, such as in this case, they may not have
been able to prove its major claims at the time.
However, conception and proof of utility for U.S.
patents remain gray areas. In this case, based on in
vitro and in vivo activity against a murine retrovirus,
Wellcome had actually drafted a U.K. patent
application for AZT treatment of HIV/AIDS two days
before it sent in a blinded sample of AZT to NCI for
in vitro anti-HIV screening. However, at the time, the
company lacked the capability to even conduct in vitro
studies with HIV, and NIH scientists were among the
few with the facilities and knowledge to actually
determine whether AZT was active against HIV in
vitro and in animals. Thus, according to Barr Labs.,
the issue is whether "one can be the inventor of a
patentable pharmaceutical method of treatment (in this
instance, the use of AZT to treat AIDS) when one has
no reason to believe that such a method will work."
Although NIH scientists did not conceive the
invention and only tested blinded samples, do they
deserve co-inventorship status for enabling and
demonstrating utility?
NIH and the federal government, to date, have
refused to get directly involved in the patent challenge
as a party to the generic drug companies' legal filings.
NIH originally cited its reasons for supporting the
generic drug companies patent challenge as both
backing the rights of its own inventors and as a means
to lower what was considered by many to be
unreasonable prices for AZT. NIH has more recently
taken the stand that it does deserve partial
inventorship/assignment status (dropping mention of
pricing issues) based on the work ofNCI researchers
and has granted Barr Labs., Novopharm and other
companies nonexclusive licenses to Glaxo Wellcome's
AZT patents, contingent upon the courts granting it
co-assignment rights. NIH is also allowing the
generic drug companies to apply their legal costs
against future royalty payments. As discussed in the
April Bulletin (p. 105), the FDA has already approved
generic AZT from Barr Labs., the largest generic drug
company in the U.S., and the company could introduce
its product in the U.S. as soon as patent barriers are
removed. When first introduced (and this patent
challenge started), AZT treatment cost on the order of
$10,000/year (about four-times its current cost) and
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Congress was forced to pass special appropriations agencies over patent rights such as those occurring
amounting to several hundreds of millions of dollars with AZT are much less likely.
to fund government purchases (e.g., for Medicaid,
veterans and military hospitals). The generic drug
companies claim that they will market AZT at a price
about half that currently charged by Glaxo Wellcome.
Barr's sister company in Canada, Apotex
Pharmaceuticals, and Novopharm already market
generic AZT in Canada at substantially reduced
prices.
Although the threat of political imposition of drug
price controls has greatly diminished in the U.S., the
case of AZT has figured prominently in some of the
rhetoric of those supporting price controls. Another
factor complicating the politics of this case is the
substantive government involvement in, and some
might say subsidy of, the discovery and development
of AZT. Even though this may not be sufficient to
warrant patent or other commercial rights, there are
still many who feel that government contributions to
pharmaceutical development should be reflected in
across-the -board or government discounts. In the
case of AZT, besides assisting in its discovery, the
federal government conducted most of the clinical
trials that supported its approval, with the cost to the
company, at most, being several hundreds of millions
of dollars vs. several billion dollars required for the
development of most new drugs. Although NIH and
the federal government recently abandoned use of a
"reasonable pricing" clause in exclusive patent
licenses and Collaborative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs; as discussed in the April
Bulletin, p. 106), there are still many who feel that
justice demands lower prices where the government
has clearly subsidized or facilitated development of a
drug or biopharmaceutical. Now with the Supreme
Court requesting a formal government position on its
interests in AZT patents, the "reasonable pricing" of
government inventions could become a political issue
again. While the political climate is considerably
against pharmaceutical price controls, the exact
position the government and Congress may take in
respect to claiming any public interest in breaking
Wellcome's monopoly on AZT is unclear.
Unless the Supreme Court formally takes up this
case and rules in favor of the generic drug companies,
Wellcome will retain patent protection in the U.S. on
the use of AZT for treatment of HIV-infection and
AIDS until patent 4,724,232 expires in 2005. The
exchange of blinded AZT samples and collaboration
between NCI and Wellcome researchers occurred
prior to the now routine use of materials exchange
agreements and CRADAs which define the patent
rights of the parties involved in collaborative
screening, research and development programs.
Federal screening programs, including the NIH
antiviral screening programs, now explicitly recognize
the rights of those submitting agents to retain full
patent rights for uses identified through these





Ruling below (Il AppCt 5thDist, 265 Ill.
App.3d 806, 638 N.E.2d 1127, 203 III.Dec. 1):
Punitive damage awards of $2.5 million to each
of three personal injury plaintiffs whose compen-
satory damage awards were $255,000, $138,000,
and $102,500 were not excessive and did not
violate substantive due process rights of defend-
ant asbestos manufacturer; there is no require-
ment in Illinois that punitive damages be propor-
tional to compensatory damages; although
defendant's potential liability for punitive dam-
ages that may be awarded in future, as well as
punitive damages that have already been award-
ed, are proper factors to consider in reviewing
punitive damage award, there is nothing in record
to suggest that trial court did not consider this
factor in reviewing jury's punitive damage award;
trial court did not violate due process rights of
corporate defendant over which it had personal
jurisdiction by ordering it to produce as witnesses
corporate officers and employees over which
court did not have personal jurisdiction.
Questions presented: (1) Is $7.5 million award
of punitive damages, which is many times larger
than respondents' compensatory damage awards
and has been assessed against defendant subject
to many punitive damages lawsuits in many juris-
dictions for same course of conduct, grossly exces-
sive in violation of Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause? (2) Does Due Process Clause
prohibit state court from circumventing constitu-
tional limits on its jurisdiction by using state
procedural rule to conscript corporate defend-
ant-on pain of substantial sanctions-to compel
specified employees to travel to state and appear
as witnesses in civil trial, when designated em-
ployee-witnesses lack minimum contacts with fo-
rum state and therefore are beyond state court's
jurisdictional power?
P~etition for certiorarled 3 U/6/95 by An E...
Cohen, Jonathan E. Richman, Robert D. Good-
man, and Debevoise & Plimpton, all of New
York, N.Y., Larry L. Sims, Thomas G. Hungar,
and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, all of Washing-
ton, D.C., and Karen I. Ward, of Granville, Ohio.
94-1890 HONDA MOTOR CO. v. OBERG
Compensatory and punitive damages-Excessive-
ness-Appellate review.
Ruling below (Ore SupCt, 320 Or. 544, 888
P.2d 8, 63 LW 2544):
On remand from Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
62 LW 4627 (US SupCt 1994), which held that
Oregon Constitution's prohibition against judicial
review of facts tried by jury "unless the court can
affirmatively say there is no evidence to support
the verdict" violates Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause as applied to punitive dam-
ages awards, court holds that jury's award of
punitive damages shall not be disturbed when it is
within range that rational juror would be entitled
to award in light of record as whole, which range
depends on statutory and common law factors
that allow award of punitive damages for specific
kind of claim at issue; that standard is limited to
awards of punitive damages and does not extend
to compensatory damages; jury's punitive dam-
ages award of $5 million to plaintiff injured in
all-terrain vehicle accident reflected statutory cri-
teria for award of punitive damages in product
liability action, including clear and convincing
evidence of manufacturer's prolonged and wanton
disregard for health and safety of others in failing
to conduct adequate safety tests and to consider
adequate protections against foreseeable roll-over
accidents while profiting from sales of product
that it knew or should have known was inherently
dangerous, evidence of plaintiff's serious perma-
nent injuries for which manufacturer denied re-
sponsibility, and evidence of manufacturer's net
worth of $4.9 billion at time of trial; accordingly,
punitive damages award is affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Did refusal of Oregon
courts to review compensatory damages verdicts
for excessiveness violate Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause? (2) Were punitive
damages imposed in this case excessive?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/17/95, by An-
drew L. Frey, Charles Rothfcid, Evan M. Tager,
and Mayer, Brown & Platt, all of Washington,
D.C., James H. Gidley, Thomas W. Brown, and
Cosgrave, Vergeer & Kester, all of Portland,
Ore., and Jeffrey R. Brooke, Paul G. Cereghini,
and Bowman & Brooke, all of Phoenix, Ariz.
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